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My dissertation focuses on the environmental regulations in the trucking in-
dustry and their impacts in the United States. I explore the causal effects of environ-
mental policies on trucking decisions, the technological challenges of reducing fuel
consumption and the optimal fuel taxes to account for the externalities of trucking
operation. As the fuel economy standards for medium- and heavy-duty trucks are
finalized in August 2016, my dissertation addresses a timely and important issue –
how to effectively reduce greenhouse gases emissions from trucking operation. Three
essential policy tools are examined – taxes, fuel economy standards, and engine re-
placement schedule.
In the first essay, I exploit a rich vehicle-level micro dataset of the U.S. heavy-
duty trucking fleets to examine how truckers respond to changes in per-mile fuel
cost. Per-mile fuel cost depends on the fuel economy of the vehicle and on the price
of diesel, which is taxed at a different rate than other motor fuels. The U.S. En-
vironmental Protection Agency (EPA) categorizes medium- and heavy-duty trucks
into two groups - combination trucks and vocational vehicles. They are regulated
separately due to their distinctive driving patterns and trip distances. Combination
trucks are tractor-trailers weighing more than 26,000 pounds, typically with a body
type of either an enclosed box or a platform. They are mostly used for long-haul
shipping. Vocational vehicles are straight trucks (with a loading area as part of
the vehicle) with gross vehicle weight greater than 10,000 pounds. They travel lo-
cally for various professional purposes and include step vans, dump trucks, concrete
mixers, etc. My empirical results show that the average medium-run elasticities of
vehicle-miles-traveled are -0.23 for combination trucks and -0.27 for vocational vehi-
cles; the average elasticities of payload distance are -0.43 for combination trucks and
-0.36 for vocational vehicles. Within each of the two groups, the estimated elastici-
ties vary significantly among different truck weight classes and business sectors. The
heterogeneity in truckers’ responsiveness calls for differentiated policies, particularly
in fuel taxes. I derive the optimal fuel taxes in a general equilibrium model that
includes the externalities of truck operation (such as air pollution, road damage,
accidents, and noise pollution), measures shipping demand in terms of payload dis-
tance and allows truckers to choose their routes based on shipping demand. In the
second-best setting, most of the optimally differentiated diesel taxes are about twice
or three times the actual rate. Compared to the optimal uniform tax, implementing
differentiated taxes based on vehicle weight classes reduces the existing distortion
and generates an overall welfare gain of about 17.5 billion US dollars per annum.
In the second essay, I look at the evidence about fuel economy and other truck
attributes from the U.S. Vehicle Inventory and Use Survey (VIUS). I estimate the
trade-off effects between fuel economy and truck attributes, providing implications
for a dynamic baseline of improvements in fuel economy. My estimation results
show that the annual rates of fuel economy improvement from 1973 to 2002 are
about 0.93% for combination trucks and 0.83% for vocational vehicles. In other
words, in the absence of regulations, we can expect reductions in fuel consumption
by 8.01% for combination trucks and 7.15% for vocational vehicles in ten years, just
under half of the targets. The difference in technological progress among fleets with
various sizes suggests that incentivizing trucking fleets to update their vehicles more
frequently can be an effective channel to improve overall on-road in-use trucks’ fuel
economy.
In the third essay, I examine the industry responses to the California Statewide
Truck and Bus Regulation – a schedule for truckers to retrofit or replace their vehicles
– using two empirical approaches. First, the arbitrary choice of the cutoff year allows
me to conduct a regression discontinuity design. I find a 71.4% reduction in the
population of targeted truck group as the deadline approaches. Second, I compare
the targeted group with trucks having similar body types but different model years
and investigate the effect in a difference-in-difference framework. Once the natural
business-as-usual rate of replacement is accounted for, the estimated reduction in
truck population due to the regulation drops to 57.8%. Using this estimate and
necessary assumptions, I also back out the proportion of trucks registered in NOx-
exempt counties that are solely operated within these counties.
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Chapter 1: Heterogeneous Responses and Differentiated Taxes: Evi-
dence from the Heavy-duty Trucking Industry in the U.S.
1.1 Introduction
The trucking industry hauls about 70% of all freight in the United States.
Although medium- and heavy-duty trucks account for only about 5% of all the on-
road vehicles, they contributed about 20% of the greenhouse gas emissions and oil
use in 2015 (EPA, 2015). Existing policies intending to reduce fuel consumption
and greenhouse gas emissions, such as engine emission standards and fuel economy
standards, have been mostly technology-based and targeted at manufacturers. Fuel
pricing policies have rarely been considered as policy instruments to reduce green-
house gas emissions (Decker and Wohar, 2007; Knittel, 2011). Fuel taxes provide
a combination of incentives with flexibility - a merit lacking in other alternatives
(Williams, 2016). The flexibility allows manufacturers and drivers to choose the
most cost effective ways to reduce fuel consumption, while taking into considera-
tion of negative externalities caused by the operation, which include greenhouse gas
emissions, local air pollutants, noise pollution, traffic congestion, road deterioration
and vehicle accidents. Ideally, one would design a tax for each category of external-
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ities, but such policy would be impractical (Williams, 2016). Instead, fuel taxes can
be used to address the sum of all externalities on a per-gallon basis. The challenge
lies in possible inequality due to the difference in truckers’ responses to changes
in fuel costs. Imposing a uniform tax is potentially detrimental for truckers who
reduce driving more than the average level. Such heterogeneity in behavior calls for
optimally differentiated fuel taxes.
Among the few existing studies that have discussed the relationship between
trucking decisions and fuel costs, most of the empirical analyses are based on ag-
gregated data (Barla et al., 2014; Dahl, 2012; Ramli and Graham, 2014). At the
regional level, Greene (1984) finds that diesel fuel consumption is inelastic to fuel
costs. At the national level, Dahl (2012) summarizes the fuel price elasticities from
existing studies and looks for their relationship with national income. Barla et al.
(2014) apply a Partial Adjustment Model to national diesel fuel data in Canada and
find the elasticities at -0.43 for the short run and -0.80 for the long run. Adenbaum
et al. (2015) take advantage of disaggregated data and find that truck owners under-
value the expected lifetime fuel savings from better fuel economy, which therefore
supports a policy introducing fuel economy standards in the heavy-duty trucking
industry. Leard et al. (2015) use truck-level survey data to estimate the effect of
higher fuel economy on driving distance, and suggest cautious evaluation of the ben-
efit of such policy.
I exploit a rich vehicle-level micro dataset of the U.S. heavy-duty trucking
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fleet to examine truckers’ heterogeneous responses to changes in fuel costs. I start
with Leard et al. (2015)’s empirical framework, in which they estimate the rebound
effect (the increase in energy use caused by lower fuel cost of driving each mile) for
heavy-duty trucks. In contrast, I look at a broader set of truck characteristics and
estimate how fuel cost affects vehicle-miles-traveled (VMT) heterogeneously among
weight classes and business sectors. I find that a 10% increase in per-mile fuel
cost reduces VMT by 2.3% for combination trucks and 2.7% for vocational vehi-
cles. Heavier trucks are less responsive to changes in fuel cost, since they are more
likely to be limited by road use restrictions. The estimated elasticities vary signif-
icantly among different business sectors. Sectors with more flexible schedules and
driving routes, such as manufacturing, business and personal service, tend to have
higher elasticities. In addition to VMT, I also examine truckers’ decisions regarding
payload distance (PD). The value of PD is derived from multiplying VMT by the
average cargo weight. The indicator, PD, is particularly relevant to the heavy-duty
trucking industry as both driving distance and payload weight contribute to total
fuel consumption.
An important goal of this paper is to derive the optimally differentiated fuel
taxes and to conduct welfare analysis in the second best setting, i.e., in the presence
of tax distortion in other markets. My model builds upon and contributes to several
strands of the recent literature. First, the analytical model fits in the literature of
optimal environmental taxation in a general equilibrium setting. Bovenberg and
Goulder (1996) first extend this framework to consider taxes imposed on interme-
3
diate inputs while taking into account the presence of other distortionary taxes.
The interaction between the taxed commodity and the labor market is important,
as ignoring it can cause bias in estimated excess burden by a factor of 10 or more
(Goulder and Williams, 2003). Calthrop et al. (2007) apply the general equilibrium
model to explore the effect of a partial tax reform on freight transport in the U.K.
Special attention is paid to the congestion effect of freight taxes on passenger vehi-
cles’ VMT - the ambiguous effect is offset by passenger vehicles as they fill up the
space vacated by trucks. Such an offset effect by automobiles is explored by Parry
(2008), who estimates the optimal uniform diesel tax for heavy-duty trucks in the
U.S with elasticity parameters drawn from existing studies. My general equilibrium
model allows differentiation in fuel taxes among truck weight classes and business
sectors, using the elasticities from my empirical analysis. The derived optimally
differentiated taxes are adjusted to take into account the interaction with the labor
market, using the method developed in Goulder and Williams (2003). Second, my
work connects to the literature on the distributional effects of fuel taxes. For exam-
ple, West (2004) estimates the effects of gasoline taxes on different income groups
using a discrete-continuous choice model; Bento et al. (2009) investigate the distri-
butional effects of gasoline taxes by income, race and employment. While most of
the related literature focuses on the effect of gasoline taxes on households, less is
known about diesel taxes on the heavy-duty trucking industry. I examine the dis-
tributional effects of diesel fuel taxes among heavy-duty trucks of different weight
classes and business sectors.
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, I explain
the data and provide descriptive analysis. I discuss the empirical model in which
vehicle-miles-traveled is estimated as a function of per-mile fuel cost, truck charac-
teristics and business features. I also explain the identification strategy in detail.
In Section 4, I present the estimated elasticities and the heterogeneity in truckers’
responsiveness to changes in per-mile fuel cost. Section 5 provides robustness and
falsification checks. In Section 6, I construct a general equilibrium model and derive
the expression of an optimal tax. Drawing elasticity parameters from the empirical
analysis in Section 4, I calculate the optimally differentiated fuel taxes, as well as
potential welfare gain. Section 7 concludes.
1.2 Data
1.2.1 Data Sources
The primary source of data is the Vehicle Inventory and Use Survey (VIUS),
which was conducted by the Census Bureau every five years from 1982 to 2002.1 The
surveying process remained almost the same across all survey years. The sampling
frame was drawn from state registration records of active trucks as of July 1 in the
survey year. Five strata were created based on truck weights and body types. In
1VIUS was originally referred as Truck Inventory and Use Survey. In 1997, the survey was
renamed as Vehicle Use and Inventory Survey to reflect its expanded scope. The first round of
survey was conducted in 1967, while only the data from 1977 to 2002 are in public domain. In this
study, I use five years of data from 1982 to 2002. Survey year 1977 is omitted due to its lack of
compatibility with the following survey years.
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each stratum, a random sample of truck registrations was taken without replace-
ment. Questionnaires were mailed out during the second season in the following
year. Follow-up mailings and/or phone calls were conducted on truck owners if they
failed to respond in the first round. Both the sample size and response rate stayed
relatively stable across all survey years.2
VIUS provides detailed information on both physical characteristics and op-
erational features of the U.S. trucking fleet. Weight class, defined as gross vehicle
weight rating (GVWR), is commonly used to distinguish light-duty and heavy-duty
vehicles. Vehicles with a GVWR from class 2b to 8, or a gross vehicle weight
greater than 8,500 pounds, are classified as heavy-duty vehicles. I restrict my sam-
ple to heavy-duty vehicles, which account for about 70% of the original dataset.
Following the classification published in the regulatory impact analysis (RIA)
by the EPA, I examine the heavy-duty fleet in two distinct categories – combination
trucks and vocational vehicles. Combination trucks refer to tractor trailers3 with a
GVWR of class 7 or 8 (gross vehicle weight greater than 26,000 pounds). Most com-
bination trucks are meant for long-distance cargo hauling on highways. The body
type of a trailer is typically either an enclosed box or a basic platform. These two
2From 1977 to 2002, the sample size ranges from 116,400 to 153,914, and the response rate
varies between 72.52% and 90.20%.
3A truck tractor is a motor vehicle designed primarily for drawing truck trailers. Truck tractors
often lack a load area and instead have a “fifth wheel” on the back chassis area, which accepts a
locking mechanism under the trailer to attach it.
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body types account for more than 50% of the combination truck fleet in my sample.
Examples of other commonly seen trailer body types include insulated refrigerated
vans, tank trucks for liquid or gas, and dump trucks. Vocational vehicles refer to
straight trucks with a gross vehicle weight greater than 10,000 pounds.4 A straight
truck typically has a load area as part of the vehicle. Compared to combination
trucks, vocational vehicles generally undertake shorter trips. For instance, dump
trucks, which account for 24% of all vocational vehicles in my sample, primarily
drive locally. Ninety-four percent of the dump trucks operate within their home
base states for more than 80% of the time. Vocational vehicles are used for various
purposes besides hauling cargo. For example, a turnable ladder can be installed
behind the cabin to provide a platform for tasks such as ventilation or overhaul. A
box truck with a rear door can be converted into a mobile workshop. A multi-stop
or step van is usually used for local package delivery. Winch, crane trucks, and
concrete mixers are particularly important for the construction industry.
I eliminate trucks from the sample if 1) the truck was acquired before or in
1972, 2) the engine model year is 1972 or earlier, 3) the truck used fuel other than
diesel, 4) the truck spent most of the year not in use,5 5) the truck was used for
personal transportation, government operations or transporting passengers, 6) there
4Class 2b (gross vehicle weight from 8,501 pounds to 10,000 pounds) straight trucks are also
classified as heavy-duty vocational vehicles in RIA. Unfortunately, I cannot separate Class 2b from
Class 2 in the data set.
5There is no clear quantified criterium based on the questionnaire. The answer is up to truck
owners.
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are missing critical variables after imputation6 or 7) the data are miscoded.7
The fuel cost per mile, measured in dollars/mile, is derived from taking the
ratio of diesel price and the fuel economy.8 Annual diesel prices at the state level are
approximated by the inflation adjusted distillate fuel prices published by the United
States Energy Information Administration (EIA), as well as federal and state fuel
tax rates published in Highway Statistics by the United States Department of Trans-
portation. All prices are in 2002 U.S. dollars.
The variation in fuel prices comes from two sources. One is driven by the
variation in fuel prices across states and the other is mostly determined by the
difference in travel distance among truckers. Figure 1.1 shows, for a selection of
states, the trend of diesel price from 1973 to 2002. Truckers in interstate business
are more likely to face different fuel prices than those who primarily drive within
their home base states. VIUS provides information regarding the percentage of in-
state trips and out-of-state trips for each truck surveyed. It is useful to construct
6Missing data are imputed by replacing with the mode in the population of similar trucks. Such
population includes trucks that share the same GVWR, model year, make, body/trailer type, home
base state, operator class, main cargo product and business sector.
7I consider the data miscoded in the following situation where cargo weight is negative, or
VMT is greater than 275,000 miles per year, or fuel efficiency is greater than 20 miles per gallon
for combination trucks or zero for any truck, or average vehicle weight (with or without cargo) is
less than 5,000 pounds for combination trucks or 1,000 pounds for vocational vehicles.
8Fuel economy is measured in miles/gallon. It is usually used interchangeably with “fuel effi-
ciency” in the literature.
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Figure 1.1: Diesel fuel price (in 2002$) for selected states
trip-based fuel prices to approximate the actual diesel fuel prices which truckers
encountered at the pump. I assume that truckers face the diesel prices in their
home base states while driving within the home base states, and the national average
diesel price while driving outside of the home base states. The trip-based diesel fuel
price is the average of these two situations weighted by the percentage of trips.
Figure 1.2 shows the average percentage of these two situations for both types of
trucks. While vocational vehicles mostly stay in their home base states (92.78% of
the time), combination trucks spend a little over one-third of their time out of home
base states. This allocation implies that the second source of variation in fuel prices
- how far trucks travel - is more relevant to combination trucks than to vocational
9
Figure 1.2: Allocation of trips between in-state and out-of-state
vehicles.
1.2.2 Summary Statistics
Table 1.1 provides the summary statistics of the decision variables, VMT and
PD, along with selected control variables. On average, combination trucks are driven
about 64 thousand miles per year, which is more than triple the distance traveled
by vocational vehicles. The difference is more dramatic for payload distance. The
average PD for combination trucks is almost eight times that of vocational vehi-
cles. When comparing truck characteristics between these two groups, combination
trucks, on average, have lower fuel efficiency, greater lifetime mileage and heavier
total vehicle weight.
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Table 1.1: Summary Statistics
Combination Trucks Vocational Vehicles
Mean St.d. Mean St.d.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VMT (1,000 miles/year) 63.74 45.25 20.16 20.64
Payload distance (10,000 ton-miles/year) 79.25 85.39 9.44 20.85
Fuel economy (miles per gallon) 5.58 1.27 7.19 3.14
Odometer reading (10,000 miles) 43.22 31.37 20.44 22.20
Average vehicle weight (10,000 lbs) 5.70 1.51 3.19 1.56
Axle Configuration:
2 axles 0.00 0.00 0.41 0.49
2 axles; 2 axle trailer 0.11 0.31 0.04 0.21
3 axles 0.00 0.00 0.36 0.48
3 axles; 2 axle trailer 0.71 0.45 0.05 0.21
Vehicle Make:
Ford 0.07 0.26 0.23 0.42
Freightliner 0.30 0.46 0.20 0.40
International/Harvester 0.21 0.41 0.22 0.41
Kenworth 0.16 0.36 0.05 0.22
Mack 0.14 0.34 0.15 0.36
Peterbilt 0.12 0.32 0.04 0.19
Body/Trailer Type:
Basic enclosed van 0.32 0.47 0.13 0.34
Basic platform 0.16 0.36 0.12 0.33
Dump truck 0.08 0.27 0.24 0.43
Insulated, refrigerated van 0.11 0.31 0.03 0.18
Cab Type:
Cab over engine 0.26 0.44 0.20 0.40
Conventional 0.73 0.44 0.77 0.42
Radial tires installed 0.69 0.46 0.62 0.49
Primary Cargo:
Building materials 0.09 0.29 0.28 0.45
Farm products 0.11 0.32 0.08 0.28
Petroleum products 0.04 0.20 0.05 0.21
Processed foods 0.15 0.35 0.07 0.26
Tools, machinery and equipment 0.10 0.30 0.10 0.31
Note: The category dummy variables with mean less than 0.1 are omitted from this table, but they
are included in the regressions. A list of these variables can be found in A.1. Other characteristics
not presented in the table include number of cylinders and engine displacement.
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Truck body/trailer type and axle configuration determine the business use as
well as its carrying capacity. A good design of the cabin (or cab) can reduce the
aerodynamic drag substantially, and therefore improve the fuel efficiency. The con-
ventional cab is most common in North America. In such a cabin, the driver is
seated behind the engine, as in most passenger vehicles. The next most common
cabin type is “cab over engine” – with the cabin located on top of the engine. This
type of design, also called “flat nose”, often results in more wind resistance and
higher drag. In the sample from VIUS, 73% of combination trucks and 77% of vo-
cational vehicles have conventional cabs.
Radial tires also contribute to better fuel efficiency. The cored plies are ar-
ranged perpendicularly to the direction of travel, so that the tires experience longer
tread life, better steering characteristics and less rolling resistance. Although bias
tires have the merit of weight carrying ability, radial technology has become the
standard design. In my sample, about 69% of combination trucks and 62% of voca-
tional vehicles are equipped with radial tires.
1.3 Estimation Strategy
1.3.1 Model
The decision of VMT can be considered as an optimal outcome of a profit-
maximization problem. Suppose a driver with truck i in state s in year t receives
12
an exogenous Pb for each mile (or ton-mile as discussed below) of delivery services
in business b. The cost of operation includes fuel costs and maintenance costs. The
per-mile fuel cost, ci, can be derived from dividing fuel price, pi, by the average
MPG. (Note that MPG is the average fuel efficiency of all trucks with the same
type as i.) Maintenance cost is a function of truck characteristics, Xi, and fleet
operational characteristics, Zi. Equating the marginal revenue with the marginal
cost gives the optimal solution of VMT,
VMTi = F (ci,Xi,Zi, θs, τt, φb) . (1.1)
The state-level fixed effects, θs, capture the time-invariant factors. For example, if
an intrastate driver in California drives more on average than a driver with the same
truck in Rhode Island due to the geographical difference between these two states,
the state-level fixed effects would prevent such factor from biasing the estimation
results. The survey year fixed effects, τt, are included to systematically identify
time-specific influences on VMT, such as macroeconomic factors, nationwide de-
mand shocks, and measurement errors for a specific survey year. φb represents the
business sector of the cargo delivery, such as agriculture or forestry, construction
and for-hire transportation. The business fixed effects capture any industry-specific
shocks that may affect trucking decisions. In addition, φb also absorbs the effect of
shipping price, assuming that the shipping price in a particular business is relatively
time-invariant.
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′βZ + θs + τt + φb + εi) , (1.2)





εi is assumed to be a mean-zero stochastic error term. Taking the natural logarithm
on both sides of equation (1.2), I derive the specification for empirical estimation.
ln VMTi = β0 + γ ln ci +Xi
′βX +Zi
′βZ + θs + τt + φb + εi (1.4)
where γ can be interpreted as the elasticity of VMT with respect to fuel costs.
If shipment price is calculated based on payload distance, Pb is the price for
delivering each payload-ton per mile. It is particularly relevant when the primary
business use of a truck is hauling cargo. The payload distance is constructed as
follows:
PDi = VMTi · wi · ξi (1.5)
where wi denotes the payload weight (in tons), and ξi is the percentage of loaded
trips. To estimate how payload distance responds to changes in per-mile fuel cost,
I follow the same specification as in equation (1.4):
ln PDi = α0 + δ ln ci +Xi
′αX +Zi
′αZ + θs + τt + φb + εi (1.6)




To derive consistent estimates of elasticities of VMT and payload distance, I
need to ensure that the variations in both fuel efficiency, MPG, and fuel price, pi,
are exogenous. Given the possibility of reverse causality between truck i’s VMT
and its own fuel efficiency (MPGi), using individual MPGi in equation (1.3) would
be problematic. Instead, I use the mean MPG of all trucks that share the same
characteristics as truck i. Since fuel efficiency of a vehicle is largely determined by
its engineering characteristics and payload weight, the mean MPG represents the
fuel efficiency at the truck-model level, which is exogenous to an individual trucker’s
decision. Thus, this adjustment eliminates the influence of individual fuel efficiency
on the decision of VMT, which is commonly known as the “rebound effect”. Ad-
mittedly, if owners of similar trucks share similar expectations of VMT and factor
such anticipations of usage into their purchase decisions, the estimated responsive-
ness using the stated methods would be biased upwards (Gillingham, 2012).9 In
an alternative specification, I include the interaction terms of survey year, business
sector and region fixed effects to capture the common effect on trucking due to re-
gional industry shocks during the year in question. If, for example, the construction
industry is booming in California in 2002, it should increase the demand for trucking
9Gillingham (2012) estimates the fuel price elasticities for passenger vehicles and compares the
estimates with and without considering people’s anticipation of driving. He finds that the elasticity
(in absolute value) is higher by 0.06 if failing to consider the anticipation of driving, compared to
the alternative case.
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on the west coast. Such shocks will be absorbed by the interaction terms. In fact,
as shown in Tables 1.2 and 1.3, the estimation results remain almost the same with
or without the interaction terms, showing that the potential bias from ignoring the
anticipation effect is relatively trivial. That being said, I conservatively claim that
my estimates are the upper bounds of elasticities.
The assumption that individual drivers are price-takers with respect to fuel
prices, though common in the literature, can be questionable in some cases. For
example, a local demand shock to VMT may cause a short-term drawback of fuel
supply and therefore temporarily drive up local fuel prices. Another scenario which
may bias the estimates stems from truckers’ forecasts of future fuel prices. To con-
trol for the plausible endogeneity of fuel prices, I instrument fuel prices with the
inflation-adjusted average prices in states that are not bordering with the home
base states.10 As fuel prices across states are correlated, the relevance condition of
a valid instrument is satisfied.11 The exclusion condition that a valid instrument
must satisfy relies on a rather strong assumption: a driver in home base state s
is not affected by fuel price changes in states further than his neighboring states.
Neighboring states are excluded due to the possibility that drivers may cross states
to purchase fuel if lower price is observed. Another plausible instrument is global
crude oil price. Global oil price is clearly correlated with local diesel fuel prices,
10In regressions, the instrumental variable is constructed by taking the ratio of diesel price in
non-neighboring states over average MPG of the same type of trucks.
11First stage estimation results shown in Table A.1 in A.2.
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and it is unlikely that an individual trucker’s operational decision would affect the
global oil price. I provide the estimation results with the alternative instrumental
variable in section 1.5.2.
The exclusion restriction holds once I control for some important unobserv-
ables with fixed effects. Home base state fixed effects and survey year fixed effects
account for time-invariant and nationwide influences respectively. The growth in
state GDP is included to capture the potential impact of local economic develop-
ment on the demand for VMT. I control as much as possible for truck characteristics
that affect driving and capture the variation solely due to difference in fuel costs.
The truck characteristics include model year, make, body/trailer type, cab type,
axle configuration, average vehicle weight (in natural log), odometer reading (in
natural log), engine displacement, radial tire installation and number of cylinders.
In addition, I account for business characteristics in the estimation, such as oper-
ator class, business sector of the shipment, fleet size and primary cargo product.
Depending on the operational area, the unobserved factors should affect trucks in
the same region (broader than states)12 in a similar way. Robust standard errors
are obtained in all regressions.13
12I adopt the regional division provided by the U.S. Energy Information Administration. See
the map shown in Figure A.1 in A.3.
13I cluster the standard errors at the level of home base states in baseline OLS regressions. State




The results from estimating equation (1.4) are shown in Table (1.2). The es-
timations are conducted separately for combination trucks and vocational vehicles.
All fixed effects and controls discussed above are included. Columns (1) and (4)
present the medium-run elasticities of VMT with respect to fuel costs, estimated
using ordinary least squares (OLS). To address the plausible endogeneity of fuel cost
per mile, I show the elasticities using two-stage least squares in columns (2) and (5),
with the instrumental variables (IV) being the average cost per-mile of driving in
states that are not bordering the home base states. The estimated elasticities of
VMT are highly statistically significant. In general, vocational vehicles are more
responsive to changes in cost per-mile of driving. Specifically, a 10% increase in
fuel cost per mile results in a 2.34% reduction in driving distance for combination
trucks and 2.70% for vocational vehicles. The estimated coefficients of other control
variables show the expected signs and remain relatively stable across specifications
– highlighting the robustness of the main results. Interaction terms among business
sectors, survey years and regions are included in columns (3) and (6). These speci-
fications address concerns regarding VMT anticipation – drivers with similar trucks
may have similar expectations of future driving demand which may affect today’s
choices of fuel economy. Comparing columns (2) and (3) for combination trucks, as
well as columns (5) and (6) for vocational vehicles, I find that the elasticities remain
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Table 1.2: Estimated Elasticities of VMT
Combination Trucks Vocational Vehicles
OLS IV IV OLS IV IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln(per-mile fuel cost) -0.182∗∗∗ -0.234∗∗∗ -0.238∗∗∗ -0.260∗∗∗ -0.270∗∗∗ -0.272∗∗∗
(0.0400) (0.0311) (0.0304) (0.0208) (0.0211) (0.0203)
Control variables
ln(average vehicle weight) 0.400∗∗∗ 0.402∗∗∗ 0.393∗∗∗ 0.212∗∗∗ 0.213∗∗∗ 0.210∗∗∗
(0.0229) (0.0225) (0.0217) (0.0169) (0.0168) (0.0162)
ln(odometer reading) 0.488∗∗∗ 0.489∗∗∗ 0.487∗∗∗ 0.489∗∗∗ 0.489∗∗∗ 0.490∗∗∗
(0.00761) (0.00765) (0.00754) (0.0109) (0.0108) (0.0108)
ln(state GDP) 0.0784 0.0786∗ 0.0401 0.0146 0.0148 -0.0135
(0.0380) (0.0376) (0.0300) (0.0464) (0.0459) (0.0320)
Survey year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Home base state FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other truck characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Operational characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Business × year × region No No Yes No No Yes
No. of observation 112,364 112,364 112,364 83,242 83,242 83,242
Adjusted R2 0.550 0.550 0.556 0.426 0.426 0.430
Note: ∗ : p < 0.1; ∗∗ : p < 0.05; ∗∗∗ : p < 0.01
The robust standard errors (in parentheses) in (1) and (4) are clustered at the level of home base states.
The robust standard errors in (2), (3), (5) and (6) are clustered at the level of states and survey years.
Other truck characteristics include model year, average vehicle weight (including cargo), odometer
reading, axle configuration, make, body/trailer type, cab type, engine displacement, number of
cylinders and radial tire installation.
Operational characteristics include operator class, business sector, fleet size and main cargo prod-
uct.
nearly the same. The robustness of the results suggests that the anticipation effect
resulting from local industry demand shock is small.
Table (1.3) presents the estimated elasticities of payload distance with respect
to per-mile fuel cost. A 10% increase in per-mile fuel cost induces a reduction in
payload distance by about 4.28% for combination trucks and 3.62% for vocational
vehicles once I control for the endogeneity of fuel prices, as shown in columns (2)
and (5). The estimates are highly statistically significant. The fact that they are
even higher than elasticities of VMT in absolute terms implies that the average
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Table 1.3: Estimated Elasticities of Payload Distance
Combination Trucks Vocational Vehicles
OLS IV IV OLS IV IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln(per-mile fuel cost) -0.366∗∗∗ -0.428∗∗∗ -0.425∗∗∗ -0.355∗∗∗ -0.362∗∗∗ -0.361∗∗∗
(0.0442) (0.0317) (0.0306) (0.0250) (0.0259) (0.0252)
Control variables
ln(average vehicle weight) 2.540∗∗∗ 2.543∗∗∗ 2.534∗∗∗ 1.935∗∗∗ 1.935∗∗∗ 1.929∗∗∗
(0.0353) (0.0345) (0.0346) (0.0268) (0.0264) (0.0266)
ln(odometer reading) 0.484∗∗∗ 0.485∗∗∗ 0.483∗∗∗ 0.512∗∗∗ 0.512∗∗∗ 0.509∗∗∗
(0.00838) (0.00841) (0.00828) (0.0120) (0.0118) (0.0114)
ln(state GDP) 0.0616 0.0618∗ 0.0500 0.0497 0.0498 0.0254
(0.0379) (0.0375) (0.0343) (0.0691) (0.0683) (0.0503)
Survey year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Home base state FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other truck characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Operational characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Business × year × region No No Yes No No Yes
No. of observation 107,963 107,963 107,963 75,142 75,142 75,142
Adjusted R2 0.681 0.681 0.685 0.561 0.561 0.565
Note: ∗ : p < 0.1; ∗∗ : p < 0.05; ∗∗∗ : p < 0.01
The robust standard errors (in parentheses) in (1) and (4) are clustered at the level of home base states.
The robust standard errors in (2), (3), (5) and (6) are clustered at the level of states and survey years.
Other truck characteristics include model year, average vehicle weight (including cargo), odometer
reading, axle configuration, make, body/trailer type, cab type, engine displacement, number of
cylinders and radial tire installation.
Operational characteristics include operator class, business sector, fleet size and main cargo prod-
uct.
payload weight decreases as per-mile fuel cost increases. While the reason cannot
be tested with the available data, it is possible that truckers undertake shorter but
more frequent trips (therefore lighter cargo on average) and/or they pick up more
profitable cargo to compensate for the increase in fuel costs.
1.4.2 Heterogeneity in Responsiveness
It is important to understand the heterogeneity in responsiveness to changes in
fuel costs for two main reasons. First, unlike passenger vehicles, heavy-duty trucks
serve a wide range of purposes besides transporting goods from point A to point B.
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Heterogeneity in truckers’ responsiveness to fuel cost reflects differences in flexibility
of schedule and shipping demand. For this reason, trucks for business or personal
services are likely to be more responsive than those in mining or forestry. Second,
truck characteristics, such as vehicle weight and loading capacity, affect truckers’
sensitivity to changes in fuel costs and their ability to comply with environmental
policies. Heavier trucks may encounter more difficulties in changing routes and/or
schedules, due to business restrictions and road limitations. Operational factors,
such as operator class and fleet size, can also result in different responsiveness to
changes in fuel costs. Long distance shipment may be assigned to trucks with rela-
tively low per-mile fuel cost, for example. Such substitution is more likely to appear
in a large fleet. For owner operators, however, opportunities for such substitution
may be more limited. Ignoring these differences and imposing uniform policies may
result in inequality and overall welfare loss. It is thus essential to recognize the
heterogeneity of elasticities among various truck groups, and design policies and
compliance strategies accordingly. In the rest of this section, I explore the het-
erogeneity in responsiveness of VMT and payload distance to fuel costs by vehicle
weight class and business sector. The elasticities are necessary to calculate the op-
timal differentiated fuel taxes. The heterogeneous responsiveness by operator class
and fleet size is discussed in A.4.
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1.4.2.1 Weight Class
Gross vehicle weight rating (GVWR) is the most common vehicle classification
used by government agencies to set differentiated standards. GVWR defines the
weight range of the maximum loading capacity in addition to the weight of the
vehicle itself. By definition, GVWRs of combination trucks are either class 7 or
8, while the weight ratings for vocational vehicles range from class 3 to 8. The
estimation is consistent with the main specification, discussed in section 2.2, with
additional interaction terms of GVWR dummies and per-mile fuel cost. I use t-
test on the coefficients of the interaction terms to decide if the heterogeneity in
responsiveness is valid. If the coefficient is statistically significant, it indicates that
the responsiveness of truckers in this groups is significantly different from that in
the baseline group. As shown in Table 1.4, lighter combination trucks are generally
more responsive to changes in fuel costs. Facing a 10% increase in per-mile fuel
cost, combination trucks that are lighter than 26,000 pounds (or GVWR 7) tend
to reduce their annual mileage by 3.81%, while heavier trucks’ VMT only drops by
2.16%. Heavy-duty 18-wheeler trucks face not only more road use limits than lighter
trucks, but also more schedule constraints especially for long-haul trucks. The trend
holds true for vocational vehicles in most cases, except for class 3. It is plausible
that most class 3 vocational vehicles are step vans, primarily used for local delivery
businesses. Their choice of routes or schedules tend to be less flexible.
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Table 1.4: Elasticities by Weight Class
Dependent variable: ln(VMT) ln(PD)
Combination Vocational Combination Vocational
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Elasticities by weight class:
GVWR = 3 -0.225∗∗∗ -0.499∗∗∗
(0.0833) (0.134)
GVWR = 4 -0.373∗∗ -0.363
(0.190) (0.251)
GVWR = 5 -0.461∗∗∗ -0.627∗∗∗
(0.161) (0.197)
GVWR = 6 -0.295∗∗∗ -0.311∗∗∗
(0.0354) (0.0507)
GVWR = 7 -0.381∗∗∗ -0.296∗∗∗ -0.465∗∗∗ -0.352∗∗∗
(0.0485) (0.0335) (0.0618) (0.0434)
GVWR = 8 -0.216∗∗∗ -0.206∗∗∗ -0.418∗∗∗ -0.293∗∗∗
(0.0326) (0.0238) (0.0327) (0.0265)
Control variables
ln(average vehicle weight) 0.403∗∗∗ 0.247∗∗∗ 2.546∗∗∗ 2.000∗∗∗
(0.0229) (0.0180) (0.0345) (0.0285)
ln(odometer reading) 0.486∗∗∗ 0.488∗∗∗ 0.483∗∗∗ 0.510∗∗∗
(0.00736) (0.0108) (0.00807) (0.0118)
ln(state GDP) 0.0827∗∗ 0.00746 0.0675∗ 0.0359
(0.0374) (0.0459) (0.0375) (0.0660)
Survey year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Home base state FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other truck characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Business characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of observation 113,464 83,970 109,047 75,829
Adjusted R2 0.548 0.426 0.679 0.562
Note: ∗ : p < 0.1; ∗∗ : p < 0.05; ∗∗∗ : p < 0.01
All robust standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the level of home base states and survey years.
In each regression, GVWR dummy variables are interacted with ln(fuel cost per mile). The elastic-
ity for a particular weight class is the sum of coefficient of the interaction term and that of ln(fuel
cost per mile). The robust standard errors are calculated based on the linear combinations.
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Table 1.5: Distribution of Business Sectors in 2002
Business sector Combination trucks Vocational vehicles
(1) (2)
Agriculture or forestry 12% 10%
Business and personal service 1% 8%
Construction 8% 26%
For-hire transportation 56% 12%
Manufacturing 5% 6%
Mining or quarrying 2% 2%
Rental or contractor 1% 4%
Retail and wholesale trade 10% 18%
Other 5% 14%
Total 100% 100%
Data source: VIUS 2002
1.4.2.2 Business Sector
Business sector refers to the industry of either the shipment cargo or the pri-
mary task. The distribution of truck counts across the nine business sectors in my
sample are given separately in Table 1.5 for combination trucks and vocational vehi-
cles. The majority of combination trucks are used for for-hire transportation. Other
major business sectors include retail/wholesale trade, farming, manufacturing and
construction. Trucks in different business sectors are subject to various purposes
and constraints; therefore, their VMT and payload distance decisions may respond
to fuel costs differently from one another. To examine such heterogeneity among
business sectors, I estimate equation (1.4) and equation (1.6) with interaction terms
of the nine business sector dummy variables and the natural log of per-mile fuel
cost. The elasticities of interest are obtained by adding the coefficient of ln(cost of
driving) to the coefficients of the interaction terms.
The heterogeneity in elasticities of VMT by business sector is presented in
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Table 1.6: Elasticities by Business Sector
Dependent variable: ln(VMT) ln(PD)
Combination Vocational Combination Vocational
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Elasticities by business sector:
Agriculture or forestry 0.174∗∗ -0.310∗∗∗ -0.0677 -0.308∗∗∗
(0.0721) (0.0458) (0.0672) (0.0500)
Business and personal service -0.490∗∗∗ -0.318∗∗∗ -0.668∗∗∗ -0.384∗∗∗
(0.13) (0.0298) (0.153) (0.0448)
Construction -0.262∗∗∗ -0.257∗∗∗ -0.377∗∗∗ -0.351∗∗∗
(0.065) (0.0314) (0.084) (0.0362)
For-hire transportation -0.271∗∗∗ -0.223∗∗∗ -0.513∗∗∗ -0.453∗∗∗
(0.0362) (0.0343) (0.0431) (0.0435)
Manufacturing -0.481∗∗∗ -0.258∗∗∗ -0.616∗∗∗ -0.325∗∗∗
(0.0583) (0.0486) (0.0671) (0.0648)
Mining or quarrying -0.19 -0.0984 -0.293∗∗ -0.0866
(0.125) (0.0731) (0.129) (0.107)
Rental or contractor -0.294∗∗∗ -0.347∗∗∗ -0.416∗∗∗ -0.478∗∗∗
(0.077) (0.0484) (0.117) (0.0652)
Retail and wholesale trade -0.317∗∗∗ -0.245∗∗∗ -0.533∗∗∗ -0.300∗∗∗
(0.0482) (0.0264) (0.0525) (0.0378)
Other -0.244 -0.272∗∗∗ -0.172 -0.549∗∗∗
(0.185) (0.0376) (0.161) (0.0581)
Control variables
ln(average vehicle weight) 0.408∗∗∗ 0.215∗∗∗ 2.547∗∗∗ 1.938∗∗∗
(0.0226) (0.0169) (0.0347) (0.0266)
ln(odometer reading) 0.489∗∗∗ 0.490∗∗∗ 0.486∗∗∗ 0.511∗∗∗
(0.00768) (0.0108) (0.00847) (0.0119)
ln(state GDP) 0.0799∗∗ 0.0134 0.0631∗∗∗ 0.0463
(0.0371) (0.0457) (0.0372) (0.0688)
Survey year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Home base state FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other truck characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Business characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of observation 112,364 83,242 107,963 75,142
Adjusted R2 0.550 0.427 0.681 0.562
Note: ∗ : p < 0.1; ∗∗ : p < 0.05; ∗∗∗ : p < 0.01
All robust standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the level of home base states and survey years.
In each regression, business sector dummy variables are interacted with ln(fuel cost per mile). The
elasticity for a particular business sector is the sum of coefficient of the interaction term and that of
ln(fuel cost per mile). The robust standard errors are calculated based on the linear combinations.
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Table 1.6. All of these regressions use IV to control for the plausibly endogenous
fuel costs. Most of the estimates are highly statistically significant. The estimated
elasticities for combination trucks range from -0.49 to 0.17, and for vocational vehi-
cles from -0.35 to -0.10. Combination trucks in business and personal services are
the most responsive to changes in per-mile fuel cost. A 10% increase in per-mile
fuel cost induces reduction in VMT by 4.9%. For both types of trucks in mining
or quarrying, the estimated elasticities are not statistically significant, possibly be-
cause of the relatively rigid demand for truck transportation at mines. Surprisingly,
combination trucks in agriculture or forestry are driven more as per-mile fuel cost
rises.
Columns (3) and (4) in Table 1.6 provide the heterogeneous estimates of elas-
ticities of payload distance in different business sectors. In particular, trucks in
business and personal service, as well as for-hire transportation, have higher elas-
ticities (in absolute value) for both VMT and PD than the averages shown in Table
1.3. The reduction in payload distance ranges from 0.7% to 6.2% across the nine
business sectors when per-mile fuel cost increases by 10%.
1.5 Robustness and Falsification Checks
I conduct two robustness checks. First, I aggregate the data at the truck
model level to address any potential measurement error.14 Second, I construct an
14Some variables in the survey rely on truckers’ recall of driving distance and travel location.
Thus, the self-reported data may contain measurement error.
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Table 1.7: Robustness checks and falsification test
Primary results Aggregate data Alternative IV Falsification test
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Combination Trucks:
Elasticity of VMT -0.234∗∗∗ -0.229∗∗∗ -0.225∗∗∗ -0.00679
(0.0311) (0.0332) (0.0313) (0.00637)
Elasticity of PD -0.428∗∗∗ -0.418∗∗∗ -0.419∗∗∗ -0.00538
(0.0317) (0.0276) (0.0317) (0.00917)
Vocational Vehicles:
Elasticity of VMT -0.270∗∗∗ -0.276∗∗∗ -0.269∗∗∗ 0.00991
(0.0211) (0.0131) (0.0210) (0.00965)
Elasticity of PD -0.362∗∗∗ -0.355∗∗∗ -0.359∗∗∗ 0.0176
(0.0259) (0.0178) (0.0256) (0.0131)
Note: ∗ : p < 0.1; ∗∗ : p < 0.05; ∗∗∗ : p < 0.01
All robust standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the level of home base states and survey years.
alternative set of instrumental variables by taking the ratio of truck-level MPG and
inflation adjusted crude oil prices. I show that the primary results, as well as the
heterogeneity in elasticities, remain robust in these specifications. Following the
robustness checks, I conduct a falsification test by randomizing the observations of
fuel costs to eliminate the possibility that my estimation results might be driven by
factors outside of the model.
1.5.1 Aggregate Data
To minimize the potential effect of measurement errors or outliers, I aggregate
the data at the level of survey year, home base state, body/trailer type, make axle
configuration, business sector and operator class.15 I apply the same methods as
discussed in section 2.2. Column (2) in Table 1.7 presents the estimated overall
elasticities using the IV approach.16 The estimates look similar to the primary
15The data aggregation method in general does not affect the robustness of my results.
16Detailed estimation results using aggregate data can be found in Table A.5.
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estimation results, shown in section 1.4 and repeated in column (1) in Table 1.7.
The similarity in results indicates that the primary estimation outcomes are not
driven by individual outliers or measurement errors.
1.5.2 Alternative Instrumental Variables
Global crude oil is the source of all distillate products. Its price is often used
as an instrumental variable for the plausibly endogeneous fuel price (Gillingham,
2014). The second instrumental variable I use is constructed as the ratio of crude
oil price over truck model-level fuel efficiency. Diesel prices in each state are clearly
correlated with the price of their upstream product, crude oil. I show further ev-
idence of this correlation in the first-stage estimation results in A.2. The second
instrument also satisfies the exclusion requirement, as the global crude oil price is
exogenous to individual truckers’ driving decisions. The estimation results of overall
elasticities using the IV approach are presented in column (3) in Table 1.7.17 The
estimates are within or identical to the 95% confidence interval of the primary re-
sults shown in column (1), confirming the robustness of my main results.
1.5.3 Falsification Test
I conduct a falsification test by randomizing the variable, fuel cost per mile,
among all observations. If the model is reasonable and the data are adequate, the
coefficients on randomized fuel costs should be insignificant. As shown in column
17The heterogeneity in elasticities in different subgroups of trucks are presented in Table A.6.
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(4) in Table 1.7, none of the estimated elasticities is significantly different from zero.
This suggests that the negative effects of fuel costs on VMT and payload distance
are valid.
1.6 Differentiated Fuel Taxes
The estimated heterogeneous elasticities for trucks in different weight classes
and business sectors provide important inputs for calculating optimally differenti-
ated fuel taxes. It is evident in both theory and empirics that implementing dif-
ferentiated fuel taxes achieves higher welfare gains than traditional average taxes.
Based on the framework built by Parry and Small (2005) and Parry (2008), I develop
a general equilibrium model including households, production sectors, the trucking
fleet and the government. The main difference from Parry (2008) is three-fold. First,
shipping-intensive goods18 are priced at the per-ton-mile level, in lieu of per-mile
level as in Parry (2008). This setup is more realistic for the heavy-duty trucking
industry and consistent with how trucking operation is measured in the newly an-
nounced regulatory standards in 2016. Second, I allow truckers to choose routes
based on shipping demand, while VMT is assumed constant in Parry (2008). Third,
the model incorporates the implementation of differentiated diesel taxes, while Parry
(2008) presents the structure for a uniform fuel tax. From the analytical model, I
derive the expression for the marginal welfare effect. The optimal tax is set to maxi-
mize welfare. The numerical calculation of the optimal tax relies upon the estimates
18 A shipping-intensive good is defined as a market good whose production/distribution involves
significant trucking costs (Parry, 2008).
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in this study, parameters from the existing literature, and a number of assumptions.
1.6.1 The analytical framework
(i) Household
Suppose a representative household’s utility function can be written as follows:
u = u{Ri, Y, A,M,Z} (1.7)
Ri, measured in ton-miles, denotes consumption of a market good whose production
and/or distribution involves nontrivial shipping cost. All terms are expressed per
capita per year.19 Index i indicates a GVWR class.20 Ri is defined by the product
of vehicle-miles-traveled, Ti and cargo weight, Wi:
Ri ≡ Ti ·Wi . (1.8)
All other consumption is denoted by Y . A is the household’s VMT of passenger ve-
hicles. M denotes total travel time. Z represents all negative externalities incurred
due to auto and trucking activities, including air pollution, energy security, noise,
and accidents. The utility function u{·} is increasing and quasi-concave in Ri, Y
and A. It is decreasing in M and Z with uMM , uZZ < 0.
19The time frame is not important for the model setup per se, but I specify it to be annual
average in consistence with the empirical analysis.
20Technically, index i can refer to any type of categorization, such as truck body types, oper-
ation classes, fleet sizes or shipping business sectors. In the numerical calculation, I extend it to
distinguish operations in rural or urban areas.
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The household is subject to two constraints - a time constraint and a budget
constraint, shown in equations (1.9) and (1.10) respectively. In equation (1.9),
M = πA , (1.9)
π is the inverse of the average on-road driving speed.
I + LST =
∑
i
piRi + Y + (tG + PG)fGA (1.10)
In equation (1.10), I denotes household income; LST denotes a lump-sum transfer
from the government. pi is the market price for good Ri, measured in dollars/ton-
mile. The price of general consumption Y is normalized to one. The final gasoline
price for consumers consists of the gasoline tax, tG, and the pre-tax gasoline price,
PG. fG is the inverse of fuel economy of the household’s automobile.
(ii) Production
Shipping costs during production and distribution of good Ri are assumed to be
borne by the final consumers through the equilibrium market price, pi, which can






Per-unit production cost is denoted by p0i , while p
R
i is the per-ton-mile shipping cost
paid to the trucking companies. The unit of production (and consumption) of Ri is
normalized by the quantity transported by per-ton-mile of freight.
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(iii) Freight
The fleet manager in a trucking company takes the demand for freight Ri as exoge-
nous, and chooses fuel efficiency and travel routes to minimize the total operation
costs. Note that the rebound effect is incorporated since I allow the travel distance
to vary with the fuel efficiency. If the industry is perfectly competitive, the shipping
price in equilibrium is equal to the operation cost on a per-ton-mile basis:







in which ti refers to the diesel fuel tax; PD is the pre-tax diesel price. qi denotes
the shipping efficiency, measured in gallons/ton-mile. Truck drivers are paid by the
distance traveled at the rate of ω, which can be translated to per-mile wage by
multiplying the time spent driving one mile, π. ki{ai} indicates the maintenance
cost, which is a convex function of truck vintage, ai. Solving the fleet manager’s
cost minimization problem yields the following equation:
(ti + PD −
k′i
f 2i





The traffic congestion can be reflected in the average time of per-mile travel, π.
Following Parry (2008), I write π as a function of truck miles, Ti, and auto miles,
Ai:
π = π(Ti, A) . (1.14)
The negative externality on pavement, L, is proportional to the shipping intensity,
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where zLi is the per ton-mile damage to the pavement caused by truck operation.
Other externalities, Z, induced by both truck and auto driving, include local and




(zFi Fi + z
T
i Ti) , (1.16)
in which zA is the per-mile external cost induced by auto driving. This term pro-
vides a combined effect of local and global pollution, oil dependency, accidents and
noise pollution. The total external cost of auto driving is proportional to the miles
driven, A, since per-mile fuel use is assumed content. In contrast, a truck’s fuel
efficiency may vary with payload weight; therefore, I define them separately. zTi
indicates the milage-related external costs per mile from noise and accidents. zFi
denotes the fuel-related external costs per gallon, which include local and global air
pollution, as well as oil dependency.
(v) Government
Suppose the government spends fuel tax revenue on road maintenance and a lump-
sum transfer to households. The government’s budget constraint can be expressed
as follows:
LST + L =
∑
i
tiFi + tGfGA . (1.17)
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1.6.2 Formulation of the Optimal Taxes
The optimally differentiated taxes that capture each group of trucks’ marginal
external damage can be calculated as follows. I derive the expression of marginal
welfare effect by totally differentiating household’s indirect utility function, ũ, with














































As shown in equation (1.19), the marginal external cost related to fuel use by trucks,
MECFi , combines the monetized externalities of local and global air pollution, as
well as oil dependency. The marginal external cost, MECTi , i.e. the marginal dam-
age of an additional mile driven, is derived by summing the three terms in equation
(1.20). The first term is the monetized per-mile costs of noise pollution and acci-
dents. The second term - the product of per-ton-mile pavement damage cost and
payload weight - is the per-mile cost of road deterioration by truck operation. The
last term computes the effect of per-mile truck driving on road congestion. πTi is
the incremental time of per-mile travel for all road users as a result of truck i’s
21Derivation detail can be found in A.6.1.
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additional mile of operation. The total miles driven by both trucks and passenger
vehicles are weighted by their value of time – ω for trucks and −uπ
λ
for autos. The
marginal external cost of auto driving, detailed in equation (1.21), summarizes the
monetized per-mile external cost of air pollution, oil dependency, noise, accidents
and road congestions.
The (second-best) optimal diesel fuel tax for each type of truck can be derived
by setting the marginal welfare effect to zero. After collecting and rearranging terms,


















in which εTi denotes the elasticity of VMT with respect to fuel price; ε
F
i refers to the
elasticity of fuel use with respect to fuel price; congestion offset βi and passenger




















Table 1.8 provides the estimates of elasticities and mean values of fuel effi-
ciency in each category of weight class and business sector. Column (1) shows the
22Detailed derivation can be found in A.6.2.
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Table 1.8: Elasticities and Fuel Economy







(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Combination trucks
GVWR = 7 -0.37 -0.01 -0.36 -0.38 6.35
GVWR = 8 -0.21 0.03 -0.21 -0.18 5.53
Vocational vehicles
GVWR = 3 -0.23 0.20 -0.28 -0.08 11.60
GVWR = 4 -0.29 0.09 -0.32 -0.23 10.58
GVWR = 5 -0.47 0.19 -0.56 -0.36 9.99
GVWR = 6 -0.30 0.01 -0.30 -0.29 7.83
GVWR = 7 -0.30 -0.01 -0.29 -0.31 7.73
GVWR = 8 -0.20 0.06 -0.22 -0.15 6.50
Combination trucks
Agriculture or forestry -0.23 0.02 -0.23 -0.21 5.36
Business and personal service -0.49 -0.06 -0.46 -0.52 5.79
Construction -0.26 -0.01 -0.26 -0.27 5.54
For-hire transportation -0.27 0.06 -0.29 -0.23 5.53
Manufacturing -0.48 -0.01 -0.48 -0.49 5.71
Mining or quarrying -0.19 -0.10 -0.17 -0.27 5.10
Other -0.24 -0.02 -0.24 -0.26 5.94
Rental or contractor -0.29 0.06 -0.31 -0.25 6.04
Retail and wholesale trade -0.32 0.04 -0.33 -0.29 5.86
Vocational vehicles
Agriculture or forestry -0.31 0.08 -0.34 -0.25 6.85
Business and personal service -0.32 0.14 -0.36 -0.22 7.02
Construction -0.26 0.06 -0.27 -0.21 6.49
For-hire transportation -0.22 0.05 -0.24 -0.18 6.86
Manufacturing -0.26 -0.01 -0.26 -0.26 6.93
Mining or quarrying -0.10 -0.06 -0.09 -0.15 5.91
Rental or contractor -0.35 0.01 -0.35 -0.34 8.52
Retail and wholesale trade -0.25 0.01 -0.25 -0.23 8.41
Other -0.27 0.11 -0.30 -0.19 7.95
Note: ηTi : elasticity of VMT with respect to per-mile fuel cost; ε
f
i : elasticity of inverse of MPG
with respect to fuel price; εTi : elasticity of VMT with respect to fuel price; ε
F
i : elasticity of fuel
use with respect to fuel price.
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elasticities of VMT with respect to per-mile fuel cost. The estimated elasticities of
fi (inverse of MPG) with respect to diesel fuel price, listed in column (2), are derived
by taking the opposite sign as elasticities of MPG. The full estimation results are
shown in Table 1.10. The elasticity of VMT with respect to diesel fuel price, εTi ,





i + 1) , (1.25)
in which ηTi is the elasticity of VMT with respect to per-mile fuel cost (in column
1), and εfi is the elasticity of MPG with respect to diesel fuel price (in column 2).
The resulting εTi ’s are shown in column (3) of Table 1.8.






The results are shown in column (4) of Table 1.10. The detailed derivations of equa-
tion (1.25) and equation (1.26) are documented in A.6.3.
I adopt Parry (2008)’s assmption that passenger-car equivalent, ei, is 2.2 for
combination trucks, and 1.9 for vocational vehicles. The congestion offset, βi, is
0.6 for urban areas and 0 for rural areas. As there is no information in VIUS to
distinguish between operations in rural and urban areas, two assumptions are made
based on Parry (2008) and FHWA (2000). First, elasticity of VMT in urban areas
is assumed to be 70% of the estimate in rural areas for the same type of vehicles.
Second, the ratio of VMT in rural areas versus those in urban areas is 60%:40% for
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Table 1.9: Marginal External Costs


















GVWR 7 Rural 26.9 14.0 16.0 56.9 3.3 1.9 0.9 0.2 6.2
Urban 24.1 14.0 16.0 54.1 10.5 18.4 1.2 2.8 32.8
GVWR 8 Rural 23.4 14.0 16.0 53.4 12.7 2.2 0.9 0.2 16.0
Urban 21.0 14.0 16.0 51.0 40.9 20.1 1.2 3.0 65.2
Vocational vehicles
GVWR 3 Rural 15.6 14.0 16.0 45.6 0.0 0.8 1.0 0.0 1.8
Urban 14.0 14.0 16.0 44.0 0.1 7.7 1.2 0.1 9.1
GVWR 4 Rural 31.0 14.0 16.0 61.0 0.5 1.6 0.7 0.1 2.9
Urban 27.9 14.0 16.0 57.9 1.6 16.1 1.0 0.8 19.5
GVWR 5 Rural 29.3 14.0 16.0 59.3 0.5 1.6 0.7 0.1 2.9
Urban 26.3 14.0 16.0 56.3 1.6 16.1 1.0 0.8 19.5
GVWR 6 Rural 23.0 14.0 16.0 53.0 0.5 1.6 0.7 0.1 2.9
Urban 20.6 14.0 16.0 50.6 1.6 16.1 1.0 0.8 19.5
GVWR 7 Rural 35.0 14.0 16.0 65.0 1.0 2.5 0.5 0.1 4.0
Urban 31.4 14.0 16.0 61.4 3.1 24.5 0.9 1.5 29.9
GVWR 8 Rural 29.4 14.0 16.0 59.4 5.6 3.3 0.5 0.1 9.5
Urban 26.3 14.0 16.0 56.3 18.1 32.6 0.9 1.7 53.3
Auto Rural 22.2 12.0 16.0 50.2 0.0 0.8 1.0 0.0 1.8
Urban 20.0 12.0 16.0 48.0 0.1 7.7 1.2 0.1 9.1
Note: Parameters of global air pollution and oil dependency are from Parry (2008). Other pa-
rameters are from FHWA (2000). Parameters of local air pollution are documented in terms of
cents/mile in FHWA (2000). I multiply them with the corresponding fuel economy to convert to
cents/gallon.
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combination trucks, and 35%:65% for vocational vehicles.
Table 1.9 provides the value of marginal external costs for different weight
classes and operation areas, most of which are drawn from the 1997 Federal High-
way Cost Allocation Study Final Report and its addendum. Summarizing the MEC
of local air pollution, global air pollution and oil dependency gives the fuel-related
external cost per gallon. Similarly, the mileage related MEC is computed by adding
up the per-mile external effect on road deterioration, congestion, accidents and noise
pollution.
In Table 1.9, the MECs in each business sector are derived by taking the
weighted average of corresponding MEC, based on the distribution of GVWRs. The
weights are derived by taking the ratio of the number of trucks in each weight class
and the total. Figure 1.3 shows the distribution of GVWRs in each business sector.
1.6.4 Optimal Taxes
Substituting the parameters above into the optimal tax expression - equation
(1.22), I obtain the value of optimal taxes and their corresponding 95% confidence
intervals. Tables 1.11 and 1.12 present the results by weight class and business sec-
tor, respectively. In general, the optimal tax is higher for the same type of trucks
operating in urban areas than those in rural areas as the marginal external cost is
often greater in more populated areas. Vehicles with a weight class 6 operating in
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Figure 1.3: Truck Count Distribution of GVWRs in Each Business Sector
Note: Truck count data are derived from VIUS (2002).
rural areas have the lowest optimal tax – about 77 cents per gallon. The optimally
differentiated tax peaks at 4.76 dollars per gallon for weight class 8 vocational vehi-
cles in urban areas. Compared to differentiated taxes by weight class, optimal taxes
by business sector show less variation, especially among vocational vehicles. As pre-
sented in Table 1.12, most of the optimal taxes for vocational vehicles operating in
rural areas are around one dollar per gallon, and around 2.5 dollars per gallon in
urban areas.
To put the calculated optimal taxes in perspective, in 2002, the federal diesel
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tax was 24.5 cents/gallon (in 2002 US dollars), and the state diesel taxes ranged
from 7.5 cents per gallon in Georgia to 31.8 cents per gallon in Pennsylvania. So,
even the differentiated optimal taxes on the lower end of the spectrum exceed the
actual fuel tax rates in 2002. If I ignore the heterogeneity of trucks’ responsiveness
to changes in fuel costs and apply the same optimal tax formula, equation (1.22),
to average elasticities, shown in Table 1.2, I derive the optimal uniform fuel tax at
2.47 dollars per gallon for combination trucks and 2.07 dollars/gallon for vocational
vehicles. These values serve as the baseline in the welfare analysis in section 1.6.5.
Since most of the elasticities of MPG with respect to fuel price are very close
to zero and/or cannot be precisely estimated, as shown in Table 1.10, I calculate the
95% confidence interval of the optimal taxes using the Delta method, and present
the resulting ranges of optimal taxes in columns (2) and (3) in Tables 1.11 and 1.12.
1.6.5 Welfare Effects
The deadweight loss (or excess burden) from a tax change can be derived by
taking the integral of each term in the marginal welfare effect expressed in equation
(1.18). It has proven to be more accurate, in some cases, than the “Harberger
triangle” approximation (Goulder and Williams, 2003). An additional income effect
is incorporated to reduce the deadweight loss in the following mechanism. The
income effect increases the labor supply, which leads to a reduction in labor market
distortion caused by the substitution effect. Following the approach developed in
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Table 1.10: Elasticities of MPG With Respect to Diesel Price
Combination trucks Vocational vehicles
OLS IV OLS IV
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Elasticities by weight class
GVWR = 3 -0.0749 -0.195∗∗∗
(0.0567) (0.0748)
GVWR = 4 -0.0729 -0.0864
(0.0604) (0.112)
GVWR = 5 0.00479 -0.192
(0.103) (0.137)
GVWR = 6 0.00116 -0.0146
(0.0193) (0.0261)
GVWR = 7 0.0592∗∗∗ 0.0109 0.0713∗∗∗ 0.0114
(0.0142) (0.0257) (0.0210) (0.0290)
GVWR = 8 0.0111 -0.0305∗∗∗ -0.000842 -0.0618∗∗∗
(0.00819) (0.00761) (0.0104) (0.0164)
Elasticities by business sector
Agriculture or forestry -0.0102 0.0161 0.0151 0.0832∗∗
(0.0182) (0.0225) (0.0194) (0.0339)
Business and personal service -0.0297 -0.0629 -0.0334 0.143∗∗
(0.0524) (0.0564) (0.0513) (0.0552)
Construction -0.0401∗ -0.00922 -0.0302 0.0618∗∗∗
(0.0204) (0.0279) (0.0192) (0.0235)
For-hire transportation -0.0496∗∗∗ 0.0575∗∗∗ -0.034 0.0549∗
(0.0113) (0.00828) (0.0283) (0.0281)
Manufacturing -0.0595∗∗∗ -0.0123 -0.0898 -0.00524
(0.0214) (0.0254) (0.0564) (0.0423)
Mining or quarrying 0.0376 -0.102∗ -0.0145 -0.0599
(0.0354) (0.058) (0.0423) (0.0383)
Rental or contractor -0.0953∗∗∗ 0.0626 -0.0717 0.0132
(0.0296) (0.0574) (0.0534) (0.0556)
Retail and wholesale trade -0.0272∗∗ 0.0379∗ -0.0451∗ 0.015
(0.011) (0.0156) (0.0179) (0.0245)
Other -0.115 -0.0214 0.0521 0.113∗∗
(0.0827) (0.063) (0.0491) (0.0568)
Note: ∗ : p < 0.1; ∗∗ : p < 0.05; ∗∗∗ : p < 0.01
Other controls include truck characteristics, business characteristics, state GDP, home state FE.
Robust standard errors are clustered at the level of home base states. Instrumental variable is the
inflation-adjusted crude oil price.
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Table 1.11: Optimal Taxes Differentiated by Weight Class
Optimal tax (dollar/gallon) 95% confidence interval
(1) (2) (3)
Combination trucks
GVWR 7 Rural 0.95 [ 0.89 1.03 ]
Urban 2.04 [ 1.79 2.36 ]
GVWR 8 Rural 1.57 [ 1.48 1.68 ]
Urban 4.19 [ 3.86 4.57 ]
Vocational vehicles
GVWR 3 Rural 1.17 [ -0.55 0.68 ]
Urban 1.14 [ -0.55 0.66 ]
GVWR 4 Rural 1.03 [ 0.78 10.90 ]
Urban 2.35 [ 1.30 43.75 ]
GVWR 5 Rural 1.04 [ 0.79 2.66 ]
Urban 2.42 [ 1.39 9.24 ]
GVWR 6 Rural 0.77 [ 0.72 0.83 ]
Urban 1.50 [ 1.31 1.78 ]
GVWR 7 Rural 0.95 [ 0.89 1.04 ]
Urban 2.29 [ 1.95 2.79 ]
GVWR 8 Rural 1.46 [ 1.29 1.72 ]
Urban 4.76 [ 3.94 6.03 ]
Goulder and Williams (2003), the deadweight loss due to changes in diesel fuel tax
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in which P̃D is the after tax price for diesel fuel, τL is the labor tax, and εLY is the
compensated income elasticity of labor supply.
Average fuel use and VMT for each category are drawn from the VIUS 2002
survey. I assume a labor tax of 40 percent and compensated labor supply elasticity
of 0.25. The elasticity of labor supply is set to be lower than the midrange estimates
in the literature, leading to a more conservative estimate of the welfare effect.
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Table 1.12: Optimal Taxes Differentiated by Business Sector
Location Optimal tax (dollar/gallon) 95% confidence interval
(1) (2) (3)
Combination trucks:
Agriculture or forestry Rural 1.44 [ 1.25 1.72 ]
Urban 3.72 [ 3.05 4.73 ]
Business and personal service Rural 1.34 [ 1.12 1.67 ]
Urban 3.36 [ 2.59 4.55 ]
Construction Rural 1.37 [ 1.19 1.65 ]
Urban 3.49 [ 2.85 4.46 ]
For-hire transportation Rural 1.59 [ 1.51 1.69 ]
Urban 4.26 [ 3.96 4.61 ]
Manufacturing Rural 1.37 [ 1.25 1.51 ]
Urban 3.47 [ 3.06 3.98 ]
Mining or quarrying Rural 1.04 [ 0.85 1.51 ]
Urban 2.31 [ 1.62 3.98 ]
Rental or contractor Rural 1.69 [ 1.25 2.87 ]
Urban 4.63 [ 3.05 8.81 ]
Retail and wholesale trade Rural 1.51 [ 1.40 1.66 ]
Urban 3.99 [ 3.57 4.52 ]
Other Rural 1.35 [ 1.02 2.27 ]
Urban 3.39 [ 2.22 6.69 ]
Vocational vehicles:
Agriculture or forestry Rural 1.03 [ 0.91 1.24 ]
Urban 2.70 [ 2.14 3.66 ]
Business and personal service Rural 1.30 [ 1.01 2.14 ]
Urban 3.95 [ 2.61 7.86 ]
Construction Rural 1.04 [ 0.94 1.21 ]
Urban 2.75 [ 2.28 3.49 ]
For-hire transportation Rural 0.92 [ 0.82 1.11 ]
Urban 2.16 [ 1.71 3.00 ]
Manufacturing Rural 0.97 [ 0.84 1.21 ]
Urban 2.42 [ 1.85 3.53 ]
Mining or quarrying Rural 0.81 [ 0.72 1.09 ]
Urban 1.69 [ 1.25 2.98 ]
Rental or contractor Rural 0.80 [ 0.71 0.99 ]
Urban 1.57 [ 1.22 2.24 ]
Retail and wholesale trade Rural 0.98 [ 0.89 1.12 ]
Urban 2.48 [ 2.07 3.10 ]
Other Rural 1.07 [ 0.84 1.93 ]
Urban 2.78 [ 1.81 6.54 ]
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Figure 1.4: Welfare Effects of Imposing Differentiated Fuel Taxes by Vehicle Weight
Class (GVWR)
Note: The figure shows the distributional welfare effect of imposing optimally differentiated fuel tax
by vehicle weight class on a per-vehicle basis. The baseline scenario is imposing optimal uniform tax
and only distinguishing combination trucks and vocational vehicles. The welfare effect is measured
in billion dollars in 2002 USD. The lines crossing through some of the bars show the estimation
range at 95% significance level. The bars without the lines are lack of statistical significance, and
therefore, are not precisely estimated.
The per-vehicle welfare effect for imposing the differentiated fuel taxes is cal-
culated according to equation (1.27), relative to the baseline scenario where uniform
optimal taxes are imposed. The total welfare change in each vehicle category is de-
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Figure 1.5: Welfare Effects of Imposing Differentiated Fuel Taxes by Business Sector
Note: The figure shows the distributional welfare effect of imposing optimally differentiated fuel
taxes by business sector on a per-vehicle basis. The baseline scenario imposes an optimal uniform
tax and only distinguishes combination trucks and vocational vehicles. The welfare effect is mea-
sured in billion dollars in 2002 USD. Bars without lines lack statistical significance, and therefore
are not precisely estimated.
rived from multiplying the per-vehicle welfare effect by the total number of vehicles
in that category.23
23The number of vehicles in each category can be observed in the VIUS surveys. The numbers
used in the total welfare calculation are from VIUS 2002.
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Figure 1.4 shows the welfare effects of differentiating fuel taxes by vehicle
weight class. The solid bars refer to welfare changes in combination trucks, while
the white bars refer to those in vocational vehicles. Four important observations
can be made from this figure. First, there is a gain in welfare from imposing dif-
ferentiated taxes on most truck classes compared to taxing all classes at a uniform
rate. Second, most welfare gains are from differentially taxing class 8 combination
trucks, mainly because differentiated taxes compensate for the large external cost
occurred during the operation of this type of vehicle. Third, the variation across
vehicle weight classes is greater than across business sectors. In fact, Differentially
taxing on most business sectors induces relatively mild welfare changes. This can
be explained by the similar distribution of GVWR classes in each business sector, as
shown in Figure 1.3 with class 8 combination trucks dominant in every grid. Last,
but not least, by adding the dollars saved, it is clearly evident that the total welfare
effect of imposing such differentiated taxes is positive. Relative to imposing an op-
timal uniform tax, differentiated taxes by vehicle weight class create a total welfare
gain of 17.5 billion dollars annually.
If optimal fuel taxes are differentiated by business sector, the total welfare
gain can be as high as 31.5 billion dollars per year. The distributional effects among
GVWRs and business sectors under such a tax regime are shown in Figure 1.5. The
majority of the welfare gain is from for-hire transportation, retail and wholesale
trade, and manufacturing. The effects are distributed almost evenly across weight
classes within each truck type category. Combination trucks in weight class 7 and 8,
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under optimally differentiated taxation by business sector, experience similar welfare
gains at about 15 to 16 billion dollars. The lack of variation in welfare gain among
vocational vehicles in each weight class remains true as well, which can be explained
by the fact that the distribution of GVWRs is similar across business sectors, as
shown in Figure 1.3.
The overall welfare effects of imposing optimal differentiated fuel taxes by
weight class is 17.5 billion per annum, and 32.5 billion per annum by business sec-
tors. If I adopt a higher elasticity of labor supply at 0.4, the welfare gains are 18
billion for a weight class based fuel tax and 31 billion for a business sector based
fuel tax. If the administration cost of imposing differentiated fuel taxes based on
business sectors is high enough, optimal fuel taxes by weight class would be more
practical and cost effective.24 In fact, the welfare gain from such a policy is about
13 times more than the welfare effect estimated by Parry (2008). He suggests that
raising diesel fuel tax rate from its current level, 0.45 dollar/gallon, to the uniform
optimal level increases welfare by 1.34 billion per annum.
24In practice, if the fuel taxes are differentiated based on GVWRs, they can be directly linked
with the Vehicles Identification Number (VIN). In this case, although the fuel price at the station
appear to be homogeneous, truckers can input their VINs and get the discount instantly at the
pump or through mail-in rebates. If the fuel taxes are differentiated based on business sectors,
fleets size, or other operational factors, they are likely linked with commercial vehicle’s DOT




Admittedly, realization of the welfare effects in section 1.6.5 rests on the as-
sumption that the following two components remain unchanged once the new fuel
tax regime is adopted: characteristics of trucking fleet and parameters of marginal
damages. If truckers decide to change the payload category and/or downgrade their
vehicles to ones with lighter GVWR in order to avoid high fuel taxes on correspond-
ing categories, the fleet composition and characteristics will be changed, resulting
in different total welfare effects. However, per-vehicle welfare gain/loss, as shown in
Figures 1.4 and 1.5, is not contingent on this assumption.
The second component is the parameters of marginal damages, which are cal-
culated based on many external factors, such as existing air pollution, demographics,
highway infrastructure, growth of economy, and changes in the trucking industry. If
higher fuel taxes induce faster technological progress in this industry, it is likely that
the marginal damage decreases across the board. For example, more fuel efficient
engine design may lead to a reduction in the per-gallon fuel-related externalities
(such as local air pollution and oil dependency) for all truck types. It is impor-
tant to revisit the optimally differentiated fuel taxes and welfare effects if relevant
changes are observed.
Lastly, I assume a perfect compliance rate or a perfect monitoring mechanism,
which is common in literature when predicting the welfare effects for a hypothetical
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policy change (for example, Ivaldi and Verboven (2005); Ryan (2012); Wollmann
(2014)). Satisfying this assumption is particularly challenging if we differentiate the
fuel taxes by business sectors, as trucking fleet can take on payloads in multiple
categories. The current categorization encoded in US DOT number may not be
sufficient or thorough. It is also necessary to design a monitoring mechanism to
prevent intended mislabeling.
1.7 Conclusion
Using truck level micro data, I estimate how fuel cost per mile affects trucking
decisions heterogeneously among different weight classes and business sectors. The
elasticities of VMT with respect to per-mile fuel cost are about -0.23 for class 7 and
8 combination trucks and -0.27 for class 3 - 8 vocational vehicles. Lighter vehicles
tend to be more responsive to changes in per-mile fuel cost. Combination trucks in
business and personal transportation, as well as manufacturing, are driven further
per annum compared to similar trucks in other business sectors facing the same fuel
cost reduction. The VMT choices for vocational vehicles for rental and contractor
work are the most elastic among all industries.
I apply the estimated elasticities into a generalized equilibrium model to cal-
culate the optimally differentiated taxes for each vehicle weight class and business
sector. Considerations of externalities resulting from truck operations are built into
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the model, such as local and global air pollution, oil dependency, road damage, con-
gestion, accidents and noise pollution. The optimally differentiated diesel taxes are
calculated based on the heterogeneity in their responsiveness to fuel costs, different
level of externalities incurred, as well as the operation locations. On one hand, when
differentiating taxes by weight class, class 8 vocational vehicles are charged for the
highest fuel tax at 4.76 dollars/gallon. On the other hand, less taxes are imposed
on lighter trucks in rural areas. It is also possible to differentiate taxes by business
sector. In total, there are nine business sectors considered, such as agriculture, con-
struction, for-hire transportation, mining and rental. In general, combination trucks
pay higher taxes than vocational vehicles in the same industry and area. Combina-
tion trucks in for-hire business and rental/contractor in urban areas face an optimal
diesel tax of over 4 dollars/gallon.
Optimally differentiating diesel taxes by vehicle weight class brings in about
17.5 billion dollars per annum, while the welfare gain from differentiating taxes by
business sector is about 32.5 billion dollars per annum. These numbers are not sen-
sitive to labor market parameters. Had I adopted a higher elasticity of labor supply,
such as 0.4, the total welfare gain would have been 18 billion and 31 billion dollars
per annum.25 Although differentiating by business sector incurs a higher welfare
gain, the cost and difficulty of implementation cannot be overlooked. It is some-
times difficult to define business sector clearly, especially when some vehicles are
25The total welfare gains calculated with other labor parameters can be found on the author’s
website: www.JenEcon.com.
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involved in multiple types of work. Vehicle weight class, however, is clearly labeled
on the truck’s registration record and can be identified from the vehicle identification
number. Setting a tax based on such labels will be less difficult to put in practice.
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Chapter 2: Technological Progress in the Commercial Trucking Sec-
tor: Empirical Evidence and Implications for Fuel Econ-
omy Standards
2.1 Introduction
Heavy-duty trucks are an increasingly important source of greenhouse gas
emissions in the transportation sector. In 2011, U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) and National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) an-
nounced the final rule of Phase 1 fuel economy standards for medium and heavy-duty
vehicles with model years from 2014 to 2018. The second phase of the regulations
calls for a reduction in fuel consumption (gallons/1,000 payload ton-mile) by 24%
for combination tractors and 16% for vocational vehicles from 2018 to 2027. This is
equivalent to about 3.09% per year improvement in fuel economy for combination
trucks, and 1.96% for vocational vehicles. How challenging will such fuel economy
improvements be? There is little information about fuel economy from trucks; it is
not reported at the time of truck sale or during operation. The Vehicle Inventory
and Use Survey (VIUS) is a random sample of the truck fleet in the United States.
It provides valuable evidence about the fuel economy of different types of trucks and
53
how fuel economy has changed over time. Our study looks at the evidence about
fuel economy, other measures of truck performance and how they changed over the
period of the survey. We then use these estimates to draw out the implications for
how truck attributes are likely to change in the absence of the regulations during
the 2018 to 2030 time period. This approach provides a plausible dynamic baseline
that can be used to inform forecasts of the impacts of the Phase 2 regulations on
fuel economy and other truck attributes.
In this paper, we take advantage of the detailed vehicle-level dataset (VIUS)
to estimate the in-use1 technological progress in trucking fleet fuel economy. Such
progress serves as a dynamic baseline for further evaluating the feasibility of the
new fuel economy standards for medium- and heavy-duty trucks. We find that the
annual rate of technological progress from 1973 to 2002 is about 0.93% for combina-
tion trucks and 0.83% for vocational vehicles. That is to say, absent of regulations,
we can expect a business-as-usual improvement in fuel economy by 8.71% for com-
bination trucks and 7.70% for vocational vehicles for every 10 years.
The second objective of the paper is to address this fuel economy challenge
by estimating the trade-off effects between fuel economy and other truck attributes.
We focus on two vehicle attributes – vehicle weight and engine displacement. We
ask: besides technological breakthroughs and adoptions, can we achieve higher fuel
economy by changing vehicle attributes? Leard et al. (2015) find the rebound effects
1The data sample in VIUS are vehicles registered and operated during the year of survey.
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of fuel efficiency to be 30% for combination trucks and 10% for vocational vehicles.
Is it possible to offset the rebound effect2 by changing the other vehicle attributes?
Most existing studies that examine the relationship between fuel economy and ve-
hicle attributes focus on light-duty vehicles. Knittel (2011) estimates the trade-offs
between fuel economy and vehicle weight for passenger vehicles and finds that fuel
economy increases by 4% for every 10% reduction in weight. He also suggests a
2.7% increase in fuel economy for every 10% reduction in horsepower.
Although it is impossible to know with our currently available dataset what
vehicle attributes consumers would have chosen had fuel economy been different,
we find the revealed trade-offs between fuel economy and other vehicle attributes
to be less salient than the trade-off effects in light vehicles. In particular, reducing
total vehicle weight by 10% will only result in an improvement in fuel economy
by 1.3% for combination trucks and 2.5% for vocational vehicles, all else equal.
Sacrificing engine power by 10% can only increase fuel economy by 0.16% for com-
bination trucks and 0.58% for vocational vehicles. The rather marginal trade-off
effects between fuel economy and other vehicle attributes imply a great opportunity
cost had we improved fuel economy by reducing engine power or total vehicle weight.
The trade-offs between fuel economy and other vehicle attributes may vary
depending on the regulations. For example, when vehicle manufacturers face the
2The conventional definition of rebound effect is the additional driving and fuel consumption
caused by improved fuel efficiency (Small and Van Dender, 2007).
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constraints such as engine emission standards, the trade-off between fuel economy
and engine displacement tends to change because the constraint affects them dis-
proportionally. If the regulation is on fuel economy itself, for example, the Cor-
porate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards, the realized combination of fuel
economy and vehicle attributes is a result of both consumer preference and tech-
nical requirement. Previous studies have investigated the effects of policies on the
choice of vehicles without considering the trade-off between fuel economy and vehi-
cle attributes. For instance, Goldberg (1998) estimates the equilibrium effect of the
CAFE standards for passenger vehicles on vehicle choices for a given set of vehicle
attributes. Some recent studies explore the consumer preference in determining the
final combination of vehicle attributes. West et al. (2017) suggest that consumers
who favor high fuel efficiency are also likely to choose smaller and lower-performance
vehicles. The trade-off effect can be different for a different set of vehicle attributes.
Therefore, it is crucial to control for vehicle attributes, such as aerodynamic de-
sign and truck body type, when estimating the dynamics between fuel economy and
other vehicle characteristics.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2.2, we discuss the
theoretical foundation and introduce the dataset. We also provide a brief introduc-
tion of the sources of improvements in truck fuel economy from an engineering point
of view. In section 3, we present the empirical strategy and results. In section 4, we
explore further explanations for our empirical results by dividing the sample by fleet
size. We address the caveats and limitations in section 5 and conclude in section 6.
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2.2 Modeling and Measuring Technical Change and Trade-offs in
Performance
2.2.1 Theory
We expect heavy-duty truck engine and design to improve over time with con-
tinuing technology improvements. It is important to have an idea of the amount of
technical progress for these vehicles to both measure improvements in transporta-
tion and to evaluate the costs and effectiveness of regulations on fuel economy. We
define output, Qit, for truck type i in year t in ton-miles as a function of fuel econ-
omy, MPGit, truck weight, Weightit, engine displacement, CIDit, other attributes
related to fuel economy, MYit, and other attributes, Xit.
Qit = f(MPGit,Weightit, CIDit,MYit,Xit, t) . (2.1)
We can derive the cost function from the output function, equation (2.1), and
write it in an additively separable form(Knittel, 2011):
cit = C
1(MPGit,Weightit, CIDit,MYit, t) + C
2(Xit, t) . (2.2)
The function C1 captures the components related fuel economy, while function
C2 includes factors that are unrelated to fuel economy, such as interior design.
Fuel economy improvement can be modeled as a combined output of changes in
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vehicle weight, engine displacement, and technological progress. Such function can
be derived from equation (2.2) and expressed in terms of the level sets of C1:
MPGit = f(Weightit, CIDit,MYit, t|C1 = δ) . (2.3)
The trade-off between MPG and Weightit (or CIDit) can be derived by taking
the first order derivatives of equation (2.3).
2.2.2 Data and Evidence
2.2.2.1 Sources of Fuel Economy Improvement
Improvement in load specific fuel consumption (LSFC) can come from im-
proved efficiency in the four-stroke cycle3 of diesel engine operation. Various tech-
nologies that improve heavy-duty trucks’ power and fuel economy have been de-
veloped and advanced during the period from the 1970s to the early 2000s. For
example, common rail direct fuel injection4 was first introduced on trucks in 1960s,
3The operation of a diesel engine can be described by the four-stroke cycle, during which pistons
travel between the top dead center and bottom dead center in an engine cylinder. The fuel energy is
converted into heat energy, then kinetic energy, along with energy loss in exhausts. In sequence, the
four strokes are 1) intake stroke: turbo-boosted air is charged to the engine cylinder; 2) compression
stroke: piston is driven upward, compressing and heating the air charged; 3) expansion or power
stroke: atomized fuel is injected into the cylinder, igniting once in contact with the heated air; the
resulting gas expansion drives the piston downward; 4) exhaust stroke: piston is driven upward,
displacing the end gas through the exhaust valves (Bennett, 2012).
4Common rail direct fuel injection is a direct fuel injection system for diesel engines. It features
a high-pressure fuel rail feeding individual solenoid valves, which provides better fuel atomization.
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and it has been further developed by ETH Zurich from 1976 to 1992. In the late
1990s, Bayerische Motoren Werke AG (BMW) combined high performance and bet-
ter fuel efficiency with a two-liter, four-cylinder diesel engine; Volkswagen introduced
three and four-cylinder turbo diesel engines,5 which improves efficiency by up to 5
percent. Starting in the early 2000s, injector technologies were further enhanced by
manufacturers – Bosch, Siemens and Delphi. Modern injection systems6 reach very
high injection pressures, and utilize sophisticated electronic control methods.
Other technological improvements that have been invented and adopted in
the past four decades include electrically powered accessories, thermal insulation,
aerodynamic design, radial tires, and more. These technological advances, along
with the breakthrough of engine designs, are captured in our model as a combined
improvement on a yearly basis. As stated above, the improvement in fuel economy
due to technological progress in diesel engines has been persistent since the 1970s.
Although our data only allow us to estimate the model year fixed effects till 2002,
we believe the estimates of the growth rates serve as a good forecast of the dynamic
baseline for later years and provide useful information to evaluate the difficulty of
5In a turbocharger, the radial exhaust-driven turbine drives the radial compressor to increase the
air density going into the engine; therefore, it improves the efficiency of the compressor or turbine.
Various sources estimate 0.3 to 5 percent improvement in LSFC from increased supercharging
efficiency (EPA, 2015).
6The purpose of the fuel injection system is to deliver the correct amount of fuel into the engine
cylinders, as discussed previously as the third “stroke”. During the process, we need to control
the injection timing, fuel atomization, and other parameters.
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meeting the regulatory standards.
2.2.2.2 VIUS Data
The Vehicle Inventory and Use Survey (VIUS) was conducted by the Census
Bureau from 1963 to 2002. Truck-level microdata was collected every five years from
1977 to 2002.7 Random samples were generated from registration record on July 1
of each survey year. Surveys were sent out by mail during the second season of the
following year. The surveys asked detailed information about trucks’ physical and
operational characteristics, including average annual vehicle-miles-traveled (VMT),
average fuel economy (MPG), typical payload categories and weight, operational
class, and more.
Tables 2.1 and 2.2 provide the summary statistics of trucks’ physical charac-
teristics for combination trucks and vocational vehicles separately. It is clear that
combination trucks, on average, have lower fuel efficiency, higher vehicle weight, and
longer lifetime travel distance, compared to vocational vehicles. Most trucks (79%
of combination trucks; 74% of vocational vehicles) have the conventional cabin type
with the driver sitting behind the engine. All else equal, this cabin type appears to
be more aerodynamic (therefore more fuel efficient) than the cab-over-engine type,
which features a “flat nose” and the driver’s cabin is located on top of the engine.
7Data in the survey year 1977 are eliminated from our sample due to its inconsistency with the
following survey years.
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Table 2.1: Summary statistics - class 7, 8 combination trucks
Mean St.d. Min Max
(1) (2) (3) (4)
MPG 5.75 1.29 0.1 40
Average vehicle weight (including cargo)† 58274.52 14492.28 6000 206360
Engine displacement (cubic inch) 785.36 197.14 200 1050
Engine model year 1989.29 5.71 1980 2002
Air-conditioning (% installed) 71 46 0 100
Odometer reading (100,000 miles) 3.86 2.85 0 91
2 axles; each axle has 2 tires (%) 3 16 0 100
2 axles; front 2 tires; rear 4 tires (%) 13 34 0 100
3 axles (%) 81 39 0 100
4 axles or more (%) 3 18 0 100
Cab forward of engine (%) 1 8 0 100
Cab over engine (%) 20 40 0 100
Conventional cab (%) 79 40 0 100
Other types of cab (%) 0 5 0 100
No. of observations 69,433
Notes: †: Average vehicle weight is derived from averaging empty vehicle weight and full-loaded
vehicle weight based on percent of each type of trip.
Table 2.2: Summary statistics - class 3-8 vocational vehicles
Mean St.d. Min Max
(1) (2) (3) (4)
MPG 7.78 3.43 0.1 40
Average vehicle weight (including cargo)† 30563.37 16162.48 5000 130000
Engine displacement (cubic inch) 533.71 214.07 200 1050
Engine model year 1989.92 5.88 1980 2002
Air-conditioning (% installed) 42 49 0 100
Odometer reading (100,000 miles) 1.65 1.82 0 29
2 axles; each axle has 2 tires (%) 11 31 0 100
2 axles; front 2 tires; rear 4 tires (%) 47 50 0 100
3 axles (%) 31 46 0 100
4 axles or more (%) 11 31 0 100
Cab forward of engine (%) 3 16 0 100
Cab over engine (%) 23 42 0 100
Conventional cab (%) 74 44 0 100
Other types of cab (%) 1 9 0 100
No. of observation 52,675
Notes: †: Average vehicle weight is derived from averaging empty vehicle weight and full-loaded
vehicle weight based on percent of each type of trip.
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2.2.2.3 Graphical Evidence for Trade-offs From VIUS Data
In theory, fuel economy is negatively correlated with vehicle weight and en-
gine power (Knittel, 2011).8 In Figures 2.2 through 2.5 , we illustrate the graphical
evidence of trade-off relationships and adopted technological progress from 1982 to
2002. Existing literature has shown that heavier vehicles tend to have lower fuel ef-
ficiency (e.g. Boyd and Mellman (1980); Knittel (2011); Anderson and Auffhammer
(2014)). Unlike passenger vehicles, the weight of a truck may vary greatly depending
on its cargo. As shown in Figures 2.2 and 2.4,9 the vehicle weight (including cargo)
has a negative correlation with MPG. The red line indicating the model year 2002
lies above the blue line for the model year 1982, showing an overall technological
improvement in trucking fleet.





8A re-illustration can be found as Figure 2.1.
9For the purpose of illustration, the data are aggregated at the levels of truck class (combination
vs. vocational), model year, body/trailer type, make.
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Engine displacement (CID) is the volume swept by all the pistons inside the
cylinders of a reciprocating engine in a single movement from top dead center to
bottom dead center. In general, engine displacement measures the volume of the
cylinders and loosely suggests the engine’s power.10 Figures 2.3 and 2.5 show the
trade-offs between MPG and engine displacement for combination trucks and voca-
tional vehicles respectively. Compared to the trade-off effects of MPG and vehicle
weight, there are more overlapping observations between model years 1982 and 2002
in Figures 2.3 and 2.5. There are three reasons: first, engine displacement only ex-
plains about 70 percent of the engine power. Second, torque is also an important
factor that determines the hauling capability of a truck, as torque measures the ro-
tational force generated by the engine. However, we don’t observe this information.
Third, the data of engine displacement was collected as a categorical variable, which
introduces measurement errors. Nonetheless, the downward shape of the curves in
both figures (2.3 and 2.5) indicates negative correlation between engine displacement
and MPG. Holding engine displacement constant, the dashed red line (the model
year 2002) generally lies above the blue solid line (the model year 1982), showing
an increasing trend in MPG while holding the engine displacement constant. This
upward trend is present across all ranges of engine displacement for combination
trucks. For vocational vehicles, lighter trucks (with an engine displacement under
600 cid) experienced greater improvements.
10Detailed discussion can be found in B.1: Engine displacement and horsepower.
63




To estimate productivity change over time during the period of the VIUS sur-
vey, we identify the shift in the cost function in equation (2.2) above by estimating
the year fixed effects accounting for all other changes. We measure the trade-offs in
fuel economy and other characteristics by estimating fuel economy as a function of
other related variables, as shown in equation (2.3). Prior work has shown that light
duty vehicles’ weight and engine power are negatively correlated with fuel economy
(Knittel, 2011). Such trade-offs for heavy-duty vehicles are likely to be different.
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Figure 2.3: Trade-off between MPG and engine displacement for class 7, 8 combi-
nation trucks
While engine performance is usually measured by its horsepower and wheel torque,
we argue that for heavy duty trucks, engine displacement serves as a good indicator
of engine power.11 Engine displacement, by definition, measures the size of explosion
inside the cylinders, which largely determines the power of the engine. The engine
torque is the rotational force generated by the engine. Horsepower is a man-made
number, and it is defined as the product of engine torque and revolutions per minute
(RPM), divided by 5,252. Wheel torque is the combination of engine torque with
the force magnification given by the transmission through gearing.
We, therefore, estimate the following equation for fuel economy:
11A more detailed discussion can be found in B.1.
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Figure 2.4: Trade-off between MPG and vehicle weight for class 3-8 vocational
vehicles
ln MPGit = α1 ln Weightit + α2 ln CIDit + MYit
′γ + Xit
′β + t+ εit (2.4)
MYit’s are the model year fixed effects. A list of controls, Xit, include the
body/trailer type, the number of axles on the power unit, the cab type, whether
equipped with air-conditioning, natural log of odometer reading, main cargo type,
vehicle make, fuel type (interacting with model years), survey year fixed effects and
region fixed effects.
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Figure 2.5: Trade-off between MPG and engine displacement for class 3-8 vocational
vehicles
2.3.2 Empirical Strategies and Results
We estimate equation (2.4) using the VIUS data. We first look at the results
of the trade-offs between fuel economy and other variables, and then at the impli-
cations of our estimates for changes in productivity over time.
The estimated trade-off effects for combination trucks are shown in column
(1) in Table 2.3, and for vocational vehicles in column (3). The factors that are
not captured by the included control variables are absorbed by the model year fixed
effects, which indicate a lump-sum shift in fuel economy that is due to technolog-
ical change. We convert the estimated coefficients of model year fixed effects, γ,
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into percentage changes in MPG over time. They represent the combined effects
of adopting fuel-efficient technologies and designs, i.e, technological progress. Table
2.4 presents the estimates for combination trucks in column (1) and for vocational
vehicles in column (4).
One common concern when using survey data is measurement error: outlier
observations may bias the OLS estimation results. If the measurement error tends
to appear in the sample randomly, aggregating the sample can cancel out the bias.
In the second model, we aggregate the data by survey year, fuel type, model year,
body/trailer type, vehicle make, the number of axles on the power unit, and cab
type to recover the average fuel economy at the truck model level. We compute the
probability weights based on the distribution of truck models in the original dataset
and apply the probability weights to the regression with aggregate data. The esti-
mated trade-off effects, along with the estimated coefficients of vehicle attributes,
are shown in Table 2.3 in column (2) for combination trucks and in column (4)
for vocational vehicles. Estimated technological progress, measured in percentage
changes in MPG, is presented in Table 2.4 column (2) for combination trucks and
column (5) for vocational vehicles.
In OLS estimation, the underlying assumption is that the estimated coefficient
for an independent variable represents the average impact of all observations. To
relax this assumption and allow the coefficients to vary in different periods, we apply
the Oaxaca/Blinder method of decomposition to estimate the technological progress.
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The base period is model years 1973 to 1975. We run the regression as specified
in equation (2.4) only for observations from the base period, and use the estimated
parameters from the base period to fit the fuel economy in each of the following
model years. This method is equivalent to holding the coefficients of the trade-off
variables, Weight and CID, constant. The difference between actual and fitted fuel
economy can be decomposed into an explained part and an unexplained part. The
explained part is the effect of changes in trade-off variables; the unexplained part
reflects the technological progress. The estimated progress for combination trucks
can be found in column (3) in Table 2.4 and for vocational vehicles in column (6).
The empirical results show similar trends of MPG improvement using the three
estimation methods. For combination trucks, the technological progress is about 30
percent over a period of 30 years from 1973 to 2002. The improvement in MPG is
estimated at 25 to 28 percent for vocational vehicles. Both truck groups have a much
lower annual rate of improvement than expected in the Phase 2 proposed regulation.
2.4 Fuel Economy Improvement
2.4.1 MPG Improvement and Fleet Size
Trucking fleet of different sizes may experience various trajectories of in-use
average MPG improvement due to two major reasons. First, large fleets have the
capacity to replace and upgrade their vehicles more often than small fleets. Newer
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Table 2.3: Estimation Results of the Trade-off Variables
Class 7, 8 Combination Trucks Class 3-8 Vocational Vehicles
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Trade-off variables:
ln Weight -0.105∗∗∗ -0.132∗∗∗ -0.217∗∗∗ -0.249∗∗∗
(0.00521) (0.00681) (0.0132) (0.00598)
ln Engine displacement -0.0148∗∗∗ -0.0157∗∗∗ -0.0693∗∗∗ -0.0571∗∗∗
(0.00361) (0.00398) (0.00879) (0.00500)
Number of axles: (base: 2 axles, each with 2 tires)
2 axles, front: 2 tires, back: 4 tires 0.0166∗∗∗ 0.0204∗∗∗ -0.0363∗∗∗ -0.0257∗∗∗
(0.00545) (0.00484) (0.00821) (0.00424)
3 axles -0.0339∗∗∗ -0.0269∗∗∗ -0.146∗∗∗ -0.128∗∗∗
(0.00839) (0.00468) (0.0127) (0.00565)
4 axles or more -0.0696∗∗∗ -0.0751∗∗∗ -0.187∗∗∗ -0.183∗∗∗
(0.00783) (0.00627) (0.0122) (0.00728)
Cab type: (base: cab forward of engine)
cab over engine -0.0117 0.00019 0.0111 0.0333∗∗∗
(0.00466) (0.00754) (0.0153) (0.00843)
conventional 0.00789 0.0205∗∗∗ 0.00893 0.0398∗∗∗
(0.00571) (0.00741) (0.0106) (0.00810)
other -0.00287 -0.00384 0.0336∗∗∗ 0.0291∗∗
(0.0213) (0.0185) (0.0105) (0.0128)
Survey year fixed effects: (base: 1982)
Survey year 1987 0.00846∗∗ 0.00875∗∗ -0.00361 -0.00132
(0.00270) (0.00422) (0.00653) (0.00467)
Survey year 1992 -0.0215∗∗ -0.0241∗∗∗ -0.0410∗∗∗ -0.0321∗∗∗
(0.00509) (0.00458) (0.00952) (0.00614)
Survey year 1997 -0.0301∗∗∗ -0.0288∗∗∗ -0.0183∗∗∗ -0.00623
(0.00760) (0.00515) (0.00996) (0.00630)
Survey year 2002 -0.0617∗∗∗ -0.0534∗∗∗ -0.0526∗∗∗ -0.0192∗∗
(0.00791) (0.00662) (0.0106) (0.00857)
Other controls:
Air-conditioning -0.00624∗∗∗ -0.0108∗∗∗ 0.0103∗∗∗ 0.00542
(0.00185) (0.00395) (0.00498) (0.00541)
ln (Odometer reading) -0.00696∗∗∗ -0.0125∗∗∗ -0.00000105 -0.00384
(0.00186) (0.00207) (0.00276) (0.00247)
Fuel type (gas = 1; diesel = 0) -0.311∗∗∗ -0.321∗∗∗ -0.177∗∗∗ -0.162∗∗∗
(0.0331) (0.0609) (0.0165) (0.0149)
Fuel type × Model years Yes Yes Yes Yes
Primary Cargo (28) Yes No Yes No
Body Type (25) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Manufacturer fixed effects (16) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region fixed effects (8) Yes No Yes No
Adjusted R2 0.202 0.447 0.352 0.575
No. of observations 99,426 18,583 90,979 31,087
Note: ∗ : p < 0.1 ; ∗∗ : p < 0.05; ∗∗∗ : p < 0.01
Model 1: main specification, using micro data
Model 2: regression with aggregated data at truck model level
All standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the level of manufacturers.
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Table 2.4: Technological Progress (in percent)
Class 7, 8 Combination Trucks Class 3-8 Vocational Vehicles
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1974 -0.99 -1.09 - -1.00 -1.10 -
1975 0.11 -0.30 - -1.58 -2.13 -
1976 1.33 1.10 1.14 0.34 -0.37 -1.45
1977 2.18 2.04 2.32 2.63 2.32 0.58
1978 3.28 3.32 1.61 2.28 2.19 1.68
1979 3.83 3.74 1.79 5.03 5.41 3.91
1980 5.28 5.13 2.80 5.83 6.07 4.22
1981 8.10 7.93 4.91 10.22 10.26 7.50
1982 8.78 8.57 5.27 8.46 7.83 7.11
1983 10.63 10.85 6.96 9.36 9.63 11.27
1984 12.98 13.88 8.61 13.31 13.77 13.75
1985 14.22 15.03 9.39 14.91 15.14 15.25
1986 15.14 15.60 9.87 17.12 17.94 18.46
1987 16.65 17.23 10.27 17.70 18.06 17.43
1988 17.82 18.41 7.25 18.53 19.12 19.50
1989 18.89 19.36 8.58 19.48 19.96 20.89
1990 20.44 20.92 9.56 18.53 18.77 20.84
1991 22.02 22.51 11.37 18.41 18.18 21.80
1992 23.74 23.74 14.20 19.96 19.96 24.03
1993 23.61 23.99 -0.14 20.92 20.80 22.70
1994 24.61 24.98 1.16 19.84 20.44 22.39
1995 25.73 25.99 2.67 20.68 20.56 23.01
1996 25.61 25.61 2.80 20.80 20.44 20.95
1997 27.38 26.87 3.38 21.41 20.92 22.91
1998 26.24 26.11 22.05 23.12 23.12 25.72
1999 26.62 26.11 22.86 24.86 24.73 29.70
2000 27.25 26.74 24.03 25.48 24.86 29.73
2001 27.76 27.12 23.54 27.89 27.12 31.27
2002 30.87 29.69 29.93 27.00 25.11 27.94
Note: Model 1: main specification, using micro data
Model 2: regression with aggregated data at truck model level
Model 3: estimation applying Oaxaca/Blinder method
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trucks are usually equipped with better aerodynamic devices and technologies; there-
fore, younger fleets on average should experience a faster growth in in-use MPG.
Based on our conversation with the industry, large fleets, such as nationwide ship-
ping companies, purchase from the new vehicle market and sell used trucks at the
second-hand market after about four years of use. Second, large fleets usually follow
an optimization business model, by which fleet managers assign vehicles to minimize
the operational cost. MPG is often built in the optimization business model as a
critical input. Therefore, large fleets are incentivized to improve their average MPG
in order to lower operation cost.
In our sample, we examine the improvement in average MPG in large and
small fleets from the survey year 1982 to 1997.12 We consider a truck fleet with
more than 20 vehicles as a large fleet. We run the baseline OLS regression on each
subsample and plot the average in-use MPG improvement as Figure 2.6 for combi-
nation trucks and Figure 2.7 for vocational vehicles.
As the Figures 2.6 and 2.7 show, the difference in technological progress be-
tween large and small fleets is wider for class 7, 8 combination trucks than that for
vocational vehicles. The annual rate of improvement for large combination truck
fleets is about 1.04% per annum, and 0.67% for small combination truck fleets.
Two possible reasons can explain this gap. First, drivers of large combination truck
12The year 2002 is eliminated due to its inconsistency in fleet size categorization with other
survey years.
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Figure 2.6: Technological progresses of large and small fleets of combination trucks
Note: Solid line refers to the average technological progress; dashed line indicates the estimates of
large fleets while tight-dotted line shows the estimates of small fleets.
fleets operate more efficiently due to more training resources and opportunities. Sec-
ond, large combination truck fleets are equipped with newer and more fuel-efficient
vehicles than small fleets. This is entirely possible as trucks are usually highly cus-
tomized. The second explanation can be further explored by comparing the average
vehicle age among large and small combination fleets. The statistics in each survey
year are shown in Table 2.5. It is clear that small fleets have greater average age
than large fleets in every survey year. The difference is especially large in 1997 when
the average age is 4.63 years in large fleets and 8.20 years in small fleets.
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Figure 2.7: Technological progresses of large and small fleets of vocational vehicles
Note: Solid line refers to the average technological progress; dashed line indicates the estimates of
large fleets while tight-dotted line shows the estimates of small fleets.
2.4.2 Age of Trucks
If the difference in MPG improvement between large and small fleet can be
partially explained by uneven distribution of truck age in these two groups, the next
question is: Why? On one hand, it can be the fact that older trucks are less fuel
efficient due to natural depreciation. On the other hand, new trucks are likely to
be equipped with up-to-date technologies. From VIUS dataset, it is impossible to
distinguish these two potential sources. Yet, it is still valid to examine MPG im-
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Table 2.5: Average ages of combination trucks in large and small fleets






Note: data source: VIUS
Survey year 2002 is not included due to its inconsistency of defining fleet size with other survey years.
Table 2.6: Discounted Lifetime Vehicle-related Costs
Combination Trucks Vocational Vehicles
(1) (2)
Technology Costs 7994 4600
Compliance Costs 32.4 18.9
Research & Development 302 302
Total 8328.4 4920.9
Source: Regulatory Impact Analysis (EPA)
provement within the same age groups.
We add a third-degree polynomial function of truck age to the estimation
equation specified in equation (2.4), and estimate the within-age-group MPG im-
provement to be 17.59% for combination trucks and 16.77% for vocational vehicles
from 1973 to 2002. Figures 2.8 and 2.9 show the comparison with the technological
progresses estimated in section 2.3.2. For both truck categories, within-age-group
MPG improvement is slower than their counterparts.
2.4.3 Is Fuel Price the Driver for MPG Improvement?
A rising fuel price may induce a higher demand for fuel efficient vehicles, which
leads to faster technological progress. The seemingly sound “induced innovation”
hypothesis was challenged by Newell et al. (1999). They argue that efficiency im-
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Figure 2.8: Technological progress within truck age group - combination trucks
Note: Solid line refers to the average MPG improvement in percentage within truck age group;
dashed line replicates the technological progress from the main specification in section 2.3.2.
provements are autonomous and the rate of innovation is independent of energy
prices.
To test whether fuel price drives technological progress in heavy-duty truck-
ing industry, we include lagged fuel prices in the main specification (equation 2.4).
Since technological innovation takes time, we experiment with fuel prices lagged by
one to ten years and watched how their estimated coefficients change. In Table 2.7,
we report these coefficients for combination trucks and vocational vehicles. Most of
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Figure 2.9: Technological progress within truck age group - vocational vehicles
Note: Solid line refers to the average MPG improvement in percentage within truck age group;
dashed line replicates the technological progress from the main specification in section 2.3.2.
the coefficients are not statistically significant. A few precisely estimated are close
to zero, indicating a lack of causal relationship between fuel price and MPG.
2.4.4 Discussion
Admittedly, there are three main caveats to our results. First, there are limi-
tations to our dataset. VIUS is the only publicly available dataset that documents
detailed trucking decisions and fleet characteristics. Unfortunately, it was discontin-
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Table 2.7: Is Fuel Price the Driver for MPG Improvement?
Combination Trucks Vocational Vehicles
(1) (2)
fuel price - 1 0.00190 0.00908∗∗
(0.00230) (0.00333)
fuel price - 2 0.000519 -0.00166
(0.00221) (0.00328)
fuel price - 3 -0.000266 0.00547∗∗
(0.00128) (0.00193)
fuel price - 4 0.00224 0.00131
(0.00236) (0.00278)
fuel price - 5 0.00281∗ 0.00670∗∗
(0.00138) (0.00288)
fuel price - 6 0.00620∗∗∗ 0.00457
(0.00167) (0.00272)
fuel price - 7 0.00119 0.00159
(0.00123) (0.00241)
fuel price - 8 0.00281∗ 0.00439
(0.00145) (0.00335)
fuel price - 9 0.00192∗ 0.00332
(0.000967) (0.00398)
fuel price - 10 0.00227 0.00735
(0.00264) (0.00421)
Note: ∗ : p < 0.1 ; ∗∗ : p < 0.05; ∗∗∗ : p < 0.01 . This table shows a collection of estimated coeffi-
cients for lagged fuel price variables from 10 regressions for combination trucks and 10 regressions
for vocational vehicles.
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ued in 2002. Although we believe that the estimated trade-off effects and the rate of
MPG improvement remain relatively unchanged since 2002, a natural continuation
of our project is to apply the same methodology to more current data. There is a
pilot survey conducted in California that resembles VIUS. We are excited to seek
collaboration opportunity to work on the full-blown survey data collection. Second,
most of the data collected by VIUS are self-reported, which introduces measurement
errors in our estimation. In one of our specifications, we aggregate the data at the
truck model level to partially address the measurement error issue; yet, the imper-
fection remains. Third, the business-as-usual MPG improvement can only indicate
the adopted technological progress, as the observations are for in-use trucks. We
believe the production frontier lies further above the dynamic baseline estimated in
this paper. With the current data, estimating the production frontier is out of our
reach; however, it is certainly on our future research agenda.
2.5 Conclusion
In this study, we examine the trade-off relationship between fuel economy and
vehicle attributes (weight and engine displacement, in particular). We also explore
a dynamic baseline in fuel economy improvements by estimating the technological
progress in the absence of regulations. We find that technological progress in MPG
for combination trucks is about 30.87% from 1973 to 2002. It can be translated to
23.59% reduction in fuel consumption (gallons/1,000 ton payload mile). The annual
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rate is about 0.92%.
In the recent decade, engine technologies have continued improving in order
to achieve higher efficiency and to meet stricter engine emission standards. Low-
temperature exhaust gas recirculation (EGR), or advanced EGR cooling, increases
engine efficiency by reducing peak combustion temperatures and thus cooling the
exhaust gas before it returns to the engine intake manifold. Additionally, a bottom-
ing cycle, acting as a secondary engine, uses exhaust energy to develop additional
power. Such technology is shown to reduce fuel consumption by up to 10% (to As-
sess Fuel Economy Technologies for Medium-and Heavy-Duty Vehicles, 2010).
If the progress of business-as-usual stays the same from 2018 to 2027, ap-
proximately 8.01% reduction in fuel consumption can be expected in the absence
of fuel economy regulation. While the Phase II standards call for a 24% reduction
in fuel consumption, 15.99% will have to come from either more technological ad-
vances or changes in trade-off attributes, such as vehicle weight and engine power.
For vocational vehicles, the technological progress in MPG is about 27% within 30
years, equating to a 21.26% reduction in fuel consumption. If technological ad-
vances remain the same from 2018 to 2027, fuel consumption will be reduced by
7.15% without any regulation, which represents half of the target.
Our findings suggest that it is important to account for the business-as-usual
technological progress in improving fuel economy when analyzing the impacts of the
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new fuel efficiency standards for heavy-duty trucks. In the Regulatory Impact Anal-
ysis published by EPA, vehicle-related cost (vehicle program cost) associated with
the standards consists of technology cost, compliance cost, research and development
cost. The summary of these costs relative to a static baseline is presented in Table
2.6. If we believe fuel efficiency improvement is roughly proportional to technologi-
cal investment and compliance enforcement, failing to consider the business-as-usual
increases in average MPG causes an overestimation of vehicle-related costs by 2.78
billion dollars for combination trucks and 2.20 billion dollars for vocational vehicles.
Failing to include these improvements in the baseline will also mean that fuel
savings from the regulations are overestimated. According to EPA’s analysis, the
fuel savings from the Phase II rules are 60.6 billion dollars for combination trucks
and 13.0 billion dollars for vocational vehicles, compared to the static baseline.
However, including fuel savings from business-as-usual MPG improvement in the
baseline, which are 30% for combination trucks and 45% for vocational vehicles
results, results in lower fuel savings from the standards - 40.4 billion dollars for
combination trucks and 5.81 billion dollars for vocational vehicles.
We recommend that the agencies consider a dynamic baseline in the final rule
of phase 2 standards, as ignoring it may result in a large overestimation of both the
cost of the regulation, as well as the fuel consumption savings and greenhouse gas
emissions reductions due to the new rules.
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Chapter 3: Revealed Compliance to the Environmental Regulation:
Evidence from the Heavy-duty Trucking Industry in Cal-
ifornia
3.1 Introduction
According to the California Air Resources Board emissions inventories, heavy-
duty transportation makes up over 20% of the greenhouse gas emissions and over
50% of the emissions of nitrogen oxides from on-road sources.12 As one of the biggest
on-road polluting sectors, the heavy-duty trucking industry has been targeted by
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) with various policies. Most of the policies
target truck manufacturers, such as engine emission standards for new vehicles. As
regulations on new truck models become stricter, manufacturers need to invest more
into technology, which leads to higher prices for new trucks. An unintended con-
sequence is that people hold onto their old vehicles longer.3 Facing this dilemma,
in 2008, California Air Resources Board (ARB) adopted the “Statewide Truck and
Bus Regulations” (TBR) to reduce emissions of diesel particulate matter (PM), ox-
1https://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/inventory/data/tables/ghg inventory sector sum 2000-14.pdf
2https://www.arb.ca.gov/ei/emissiondata.htm
3See a detailed discussion in Jacobsen and Van Benthem (2015).
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ides of nitrogen (NOx) and other criteria pollutants from heavy-duty diesel-fueled
vehicles, and to encourage a faster turnover of the truck fleet. This policy sets dead-
lines for truckers operating in California to retrofit or upgrade their engines based
on the model year and body type of their vehicles. What are truckers’ responses
to such regulation? In this paper, we estimate the effects of the retrofit deadlines
on 1) truck population, 2) vehicle-miles traveled, 3) fuel-consumption and 4) NOx
emissions. The estimates are particularly important to approximate the cost of this
regulation, as well as the expected benefit in terms of reduced pollution.
To assess truckers’ response to TBR, we use data aggregated at the level of
truck model, county and year from EMFAC 2014 Web Database, which are available
on the public domain.4 Compliance with the regulations should be reflected in a
decline in truck population in targeted vehicle models in the year of the deadline.
In addition to truck population, we also observe average daily travel distance and
vehicle-miles traveled (VMT). If the old vehicles are scrapped in lieu of replaced, we
may expect VMT to decrease less compared to the changes in truck population.
The earliest deadline specified in the Truck and Bus Regulation requires heavy-
duty trucks with model years 1996 to 1999 to be retrofitted or replaced by January
1, 2012. The arbitrary choice of the cutoff model year 1996 suggests that we can
4The data can be downloaded from California ARB’s website:
https://www.arb.ca.gov/emfac/2014/
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investigate the effect of the regulations using regression discontinuity (RD) design.5
We compare the outcome variables for vehicles with model years just below and
above 1996. If other factors affecting people’s decision of replacement are similar
around the cutoff model year, 1996, RD designs control for those factors and the dif-
ference in outcome variables can be attributed to the effect of the regulation. Since
this regulation was announced in December 2008, MY 1996 truck owners’ initial
purchase decisions should not be influenced. We find that the truck population is
reduced by 71% once the regulation becomes binding. Fuel consumption and NOx
emission are reduced by around 80% for the targeted group of trucks.
We take advantage of the fact that only a subset of the model years are subject
to the 2012 deadline, and further identify the effect using a difference-in-difference
(DD) estimation method. This method is often used in the literature to estimate
the effect of a shock (for example, a sudden change in regulation) by comparing the
changes in pre- and post- outcomes for treatment groups and control groups. One
of the first and well-cited examples using a DD method is Card et al. (1994). They
compare the changes in employment in Pennsylvania and New Jersey to identify the
effect of a minimum wage raise in New Jersey. Cutter and Neidell (2009) use a DD
method as an extension to a RD design to reveal people’s transportation choices
in response to a public voluntary program intending to reduce pollutant emissions.
In this paper, we set the control group as the trucks with the same attributes as
5RD designs are increasingly being used to assess the impacts of regulations. See Cook (2008)
for a summary in statistics and economics.
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the targeted group but with different model years; therefore, these trucks are not
subject to the 2012 deadline. The DD results show that in 2012, the targeted truck
populations were reduced by 58%. Total VMT and fuel consumption were reduced
by 71% and NOx emission from the targeted truck group dropped by 76%.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: we introduce the “Truck and
Bus Regulation” in more details in section 2. In section 3, we summarize the data
and present graphical evidence, which gives an intuitive grasp of our hypothesis. In
section 4, we elaborate on the estimation methods – regression discontinuity design
and difference-in-differnce method, followed by the estimation results. In section 5,
we apply the difference-in-difference estimation model to a subsample of the data
and calculate the percentage of trucks that are exempt from the 2012 deadline. We
conclude with policy implications in section 6, and discuss the possible extension
from this paper.
3.2 California’s Engine Model Year Schedule
3.2.1 The Regulation
The California Truck and Bus Regulation (2014) requires targeted heavy-duty
trucks to either retrofit, by installing PM filters, or replace existing engines with
2010 model year engines or newer to meet the emission standards. TBR specifies
a schedule for truck fleet to comply based on their truck types, engine model years
(MY), operation areas and compliance choices.
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Table 3.1: Engine Model Year Schedule for Heavier Trucks
Engine Model Year Replacement Date (from January 1)
Pre-1994 No requirements until 2015, then 2010 engine
1994-1995 No requirements until 2016, then 2010 engine
1996-1999 PM filter from 2012 to 2020, then 2010 engine
2000-2004 PM filter from 2013 to 2021, then 2010 engine
2005-2006 PM filter from 2014 to 2022, then 2010 engine
2007-2009 No requirements until 2023, then 2010 engine
2010 or newer Meets final requirements
Note: This table is a replication of the table in “Truck and Bus Regulation
Model Year Schedules and Options” published by California ARB on web page
https://www.arb.ca.gov/msprog/onrdiesel/onrdiesel.htm.
The schedule for retrofit and replacement deadlines for heavy-heavy duty
trucks (GVWR greater than 26,000 lbs) is shown in Table 3.1. The earliest deadline
requires engine model year 1996 to 1999 vehicles to be equipped with a PM filter by
January 1, 2012 in order to operate in California and meet PM and NOx emissions
requirements. Alternatively, an operator of the targeted vehicle group could retire
the vehicle or replace it with a newer model.6 In this paper, we restrict our attention
to the 2012 deadline and investigate the effects on truck population, other trucking
decisions, and emissions.
6This schedule can be adjusted with credits for early action or adding advance technology
vehicles to delay compliance until January 1, 2017. To be more specific, a trucking firm can get
credits for downsizing the heavier trucks fleet, and/or adding alternative fueled or hybrid vehicles.
Early installation of PM filters and/or addition of vehicles with originally equipped PM filters
are also rewarded with credits. Excess PM filter credits in the Truck and Bus regulation may be
exchanged with those in the in-use off-road diesel vehicle regulation until January 1, 2017.
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3.2.2 NOx-exempt Areas
According to California Air Resources Board (ARB), vehicles operated solely
within defined NOx-exempt areas “can meet PM filter requirements on a delayed
schedule from 2015 to 2020 and do not need to be replaced after they are equipped
with PM filters.” Truck owners are required to report their fleet information and
identify their truck(s) that is(are) eligible for this flexible compliance program in
each January or within 30 days of purchasing. The NOx-exempt counties include
Alpine, Colusa, Del Norte, Glenn, Humboldt, Lake, Lassen, Mendocino, Modoc,
Monterey, Plumas, San Benito, San Luis Obispo, Santa Barbara, Santa Cruz,
Shasta, Sierra, Siskiyou, Trinity, Tehama, and Yuba.7 The NOx-exempt areas
are typically those that are outside of the Clean Air Act non-attainment counties




Our main data source is the Emission FACtors (EMFAC) Web Database. EM-
FAC is a model developed by the California ARB to calculate vehicle emissions, in-
7Details regarding this exemption can be found in the staff report
https://www.arb.ca.gov/regact/2008/truckbus08/tbisor.pdf. Subsequent amendments to TBR
have included more counties.
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ventories, and rates. The publicly available data that are based on historical records
span from 2000 to 2013.8 The data are aggregated at the level of county, calendar
year, vehicle class, fuel type and model year.
The heavy duty vehicle inventory for EMFAC is generated from the vehicle
registration data provided by the California Department of Motor Vehicles and Cal-
ifornia International Registration Plan. ARB staff processed the data to determine
vehicle class designations and populated the EMFAC database with vehicle counts
and vehicle activity.
We observe vehicle population (in each aggregation unit), average daily vehicle-
miles-traveled (VMT), fuel consumption, and emissions rates. Tables 3.2 and 3.3
provide the summary statistics of the dataset. Targeted group in columns (1) and
(4) represents the heavy-duty trucks with model years from 1996 to 1999 in reg-
ulated counties. They are subject to the 2012 deadline. The other two groups -
NOx-exempt group and Other MY group - are not subject to this particular dead-
line. NOx-exempt group in column (2) and (5) includes trucks with model year
from 1996 to 1999 operating in NOx-exempt counties. From Table 3.2, we can see
that there are fewer heavy-duty trucks in NOx-exempt counties: counties outside of
non-attainment areas are generally smaller and less urban. However, vehicle-level
activities are similar on average between these two groups, and daily VMT per ve-
8The data from 2014 onwards are generated from the EMFAC model for the purpose of fore-
casting; therefore, we exclude them from our analysis.
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hicle looks comparable across all years. Other MY group in columns (3) and (6)
refers to heavy-duty trucks with model years before 1996 or after 1999 in regulated
counties. Column (3) in Table 3.2 shows that the truck population didn’t change
much from 2000 to 2012, while the number of trucks in Targeted group (column 1)
was reduced by more than 30% from 2011 to 2012. Similarly, Table 3.3 implies a
lack of variation in fuel consumption and NOx for Other MY group, compared to
those in Targeted group.
3.3.2 Graphical Evidence
Figure 3.1 provides an illustration of the changes in truck population from
2011 to 2012. Each dot on the line indicates the percentage change in population
from 2011 to 2012 for a specific model year truck group. The number of trucks in
the targeted truck group in regular counties is shown by the blue solid line. The red
dashed line traces the percentage change in population for trucks with the same body
type and model years as those in the targeted group but registered in NOx-exempt
counties. As explained in section 3.2.1, the 2012 deadline applies to heavy-duty
trucks with model years from 1996 to 1999. The reason why we see a decrease not
only for trucks in regular counties but also in NOx-exempt counties is because the
exemption only applies to trucks that are operated solely in NOx-exempt counties.
Many vehicles registered within a NOx-exempt county occasionally operate outside
the counties boundaries. In other words, some trucks in our dataset, although
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Table 3.2: Summary Statistics: Truck Population and Vehicle-miles Traveled
Truck population (millions) VMT (miles/day, vehicle)
Targeted NOx-exempt Other MY Targeted NOx-exempt Other MY
Calendar year (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
2000 17.12 3.02 8.62 180.75 187.01 91.57
(41.44) (6.02) (28.11) (135.29) (139.27) (68.53)
2001 17.61 3.06 8.46 175.49 181.59 92.72
(39.14) (5.32) (28.08) (137.39) (141.53) (75.28)
2002 18.58 3.2 7.79 169.76 174.98 95.66
(40.87) (5.53) (25.85) (125.05) (128.52) (78.24)
2003 21.08 3.61 8.55 152.32 156.79 91.18
(46.73) (5.91) (28.97) (112.18) (115.11) (79.01)
2004 22.43 3.55 8.25 141.50 145.52 90.4
(49.18) (6.15) (29.24) (98.34) (100.86) (77.36)
2005 22.00 3.34 8.81 128.96 131.68 88.96
(49.34) (5.73) (32.46) (82.31) (84.33) (74.5)
2006 23.11 3.44 9.43 113.98 115.3 84.65
(53.4) (5.79) (34.48) (68.7) (70.31) (70.84)
2007 22.36 3.37 9.42 107.27 108.39 85.01
(52.89) (5.5) (33.85) (63.48) (64.92) (73.04)
2008 21.84 3.3 9.16 99.77 100.25 84.28
(54.48) (5.55) (32.24) (57.96) (59.13) (73.76)
2009 18.65 2.92 8.59 92.95 92.93 83.86
(46.37) (4.91) (30.25) (51.91) (52.73) (73.74)
2010 17.32 2.92 9.99 85.04 84.53 80.25
(46.04) (5.12) (39.32) (43.3) (43.49) (71.49)
2011 15.93 2.68 10.14 80.45 79.77 81.72
(43.24) (4.76) (38.45) (39.78) (39.73) (72.39)
2012 10.01 1.9 10.98 70.54 69.67 76.99
(25.08) (3.29) (41.71) (33.18) (32.26) (65.27)
Total 19.08 3.1 9.12 122.77 124.7 86.42
(46) (5.41) (33.08) (95.22) (97.95) (73.55)
Note: Columns (1) and (4) are for targeted group – heavy-duty trucks with model years from 1996
to 1999 operating in non NOx-exempt counties. They are subject to Truck and Bus Regulation.
Columns (2) and (5) are for NOx-exempt group – heavy-duty trucks with model year from 1996 to
1999 operating in NOx-exempt counties; therefore, they are not subject to the regulation. Columns
(3) and (6) are for other MY group – heavy-duty trucks with model years either older than 1996
or younger than 1999, operating in non NOx-exempt counties. They are not required to retrofit
by 2012.
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Table 3.3: Summary Statistics: Fuel Consumption and CO2 Emission
Fuel consumption (gallons/mile) NOx emissions (1000 tons/day)
Targeted NOx-exempt Other MY Targeted NOx-exempt Other MY
Calendar year (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
2000 0.82 0.14 0.23 0.11 0.02 0.03
(2.69) (0.42) (1.1) (0.38) (0.06) (0.15)
2001 0.79 0.14 0.23 0.11 0.02 0.03
(2.3) (0.35) (1.15) (0.33) (0.05) (0.16)
2002 0.81 0.14 0.23 0.12 0.02 0.03
(2.31) (0.35) (1.14) (0.34) (0.05) (0.16)
2003 0.78 0.14 0.23 0.11 0.02 0.03
(2.18) (0.33) (1.14) (0.33) (0.05) (0.15)
2004 0.77 0.12 0.23 0.11 0.02 0.03
(2.11) (0.31) (1.25) (0.32) (0.05) (0.15)
2005 0.65 0.1 0.25 0.09 0.01 0.03
(1.75) (0.23) (1.49) (0.26) (0.03) (0.17)
2006 0.59 0.09 0.26 0.08 0.01 0.03
(1.58) (0.2) (1.44) (0.23) (0.03) (0.16)
2007 0.53 0.08 0.26 0.07 0.01 0.03
(1.46) (0.17) (1.44) (0.21) (0.03) (0.15)
2008 0.46 0.07 0.24 0.06 0.01 0.02
(1.3) (0.14) (1.23) (0.19) (0.02) (0.11)
2009 0.36 0.05 0.22 0.05 0.01 0.02
(1.02) (0.11) (1.13) (0.15) (0.02) (0.1)
2010 0.30 0.05 0.24 0.04 0.01 0.02
(0.89) (0.1) (1.26) (0.13) (0.01) (0.1)
2011 0.26 0.04 0.25 0.03 0.01 0.02
(0.79) (0.09) (1.24) (0.11) (0.01) (0.09)
2012 0.13 0.02 0.27 0.02 0 0.02
(0.37) (0.05) (1.34) (0.05) (0.01) (0.09)
Total 0.56 0.09 0.24 0.08 0.01 0.03
(1.74) (0.25) (1.27) (0.25) (0.04) (0.14)
Note: Columns (1) and (4) are for targeted group – heavy-duty trucks with model years from 1996
to 1999 operating in non NOx-exempt counties. They are subject to Truck and Bus Regulation.
Columns (2) and (5) are for NOx-exempt group – heavy-duty trucks with model year from 1996 to
1999 operating in NOx-exempt counties; therefore, they are not subject to the regulation. Columns
(3) and (6) are for other MY group – heavy-duty trucks with model years either older than 1996
or younger than 1999, operating in non NOx-exempt counties. They are not required to retrofit
by 2012.
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registered in NOx-exempt counties, are still subject to the regulation. The wedge
between these two lines infers the proportion of trucks that are solely operated in
NOx-exempt counties over the ones registered in these counties. This estimate will
be furthered discussed in section 3.5.
Figure 3.1: Percentage change in truck population from 2011 to 2012
3.4 Empirical Analysis
3.4.1 Regression Discontinuity (RD) Design
In theory, RD design only uses the sample that is relevant to the policy. We
restrict our sample to include only HD trucks with relevant model years in regulated
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counties (non NOx-exempt counties) in calendar year 2012. The benefits of using
RD designs include 1) post-policy functional form does not have to be the same as
pre-policy; 2) MYs that are further away from the cutoff (model years 1996 to 1999)
have less weight in explaining the difference in results. As explained in section 3.2.1,
the model year of an HD truck in a non NOx-exempt county is the only deterministic
factor of retrofit requirement; therefore, there is no other confounding variable other
than model year. Without the 2012 deadline, we should expect the number of trucks
moves smoothly across all model years. As Figure 3.1 suggests, the sudden drop
in model year 1996 can be used to estimate the direct impact of the regulation.
Suppose xi denotes the difference between the model year in question and the cutoff
model year 1996:
xi = MYi − 1996 . (3.1)
The retrofit requirement can be defined as follows:
Ti =

1 if xi ≥ 0
0 if xi < 0
. (3.2)
We can construct the RD estimates by fitting
yi = f(xi) + ρTi + ξi, (3.3)
in which yi represents the outcome variable, truck population and VMT. The re-
gression function can be written as follows:
yi = α + β1xi + β2x
2
i + ρTi + γ1xiTi + γ2x
2
iTi + ξi. (3.4)
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Table 3.4: Estimation Results: Regression Discontinuity Design





(in log) (millions) (million
miles/day)
(gallons/mile) (1000 tons/day)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
β1 0.532
∗∗ 0.554∗∗ 0.628∗∗∗ 0.701∗∗∗
(0.233) (0.234) (0.234) (0.234)
β2 0.0667 0.0672 0.0922 0.117**
(0.0581) (0.0582) (0.0582) (0.0582)
ρ -0.714∗∗∗ -0.745∗∗∗ -0.795∗∗∗ -0.846∗∗∗
(0.210) (0.210) (0.210) (0.210)
γ1 -0.375 -0.377 -0.450
∗ -0.602∗∗
(0.245) (0.245) (0.245) (0.245)
γ2 -0.0550 -0.0470 -0.0684 -0.0538
(0.0626) (0.0627) (0.0627) (0.0628)
N 5697 5697 5697 5697
adj. R2 0.804 0.807 0.808 0.805
Note: ∗ : p < 0.1; ∗∗ : p < 0.05; ∗∗∗ : p < 0.01
Vehicle class fixed effects and county fixed effects are included in all regressions.
The trends before and after MY 1996 can be modeled as either binomial functions
(Table 3.4) or linear functions (in Appendix Table C.2). The corresponding coef-
ficients can be estimated by β’s and γ’s. The effect of the policy for trucks with
model year 1996 is estimated as ρ.
Table 3.4 shows the results of the RD regression where we restrict the sam-
ple to be between model years 1993 and 1999. The main coefficient of interest, ρ,
indicates the impact of the regulation for model year 1996 HD trucks. Column (1)
in Table 3.4 indicates that trucks with model year 1996 to 1999 experienced a drop
in populations of 71% from 2011 to 2012. Column (2) in Table 3.5 indicates that
this is reflected in a proportional change in VMT from model year 1996 to 1999
vehicles. Columns (3) and (4) in Table 3.5 indicate a slightly greater reduction in
fuel consumption and NOx emissions at around 80% to 85%.
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The coefficients, β’s, in Table 3.4 are positive in all columns, showing trends
in vehicle retirement and vehicle use. Column (1) indicates that between ages of 13
to 19 years, there is on average a 53% attrition rate in vehicle population. Similarly,
columns (2) through (4) reflect how this change in vehicle population translates into
changes in VMT, fuel consumption and NOx emissions.
The coefficients, γ’s, provide differences in trends that may differentiate the
model year 1996 through 1999 vehicles. Neither of the coefficients for truck pop-
ulation nor those for VMT are statistically significant, suggesting that the trends
for these vehicles are similar to the vehicles with model year 1993 through 1995.
The estimated γ’s are negative and statistically significant for fuel consumption and
NOx emissions, implying that the general trend for these two outcome variables are
flatter post-MY 1996 comparing to pre-MY 1996.9
3.4.2 Difference-in-difference Model
We apply a difference-in-difference (DD) model to identify the effect of the
retrofit/replacement requirements with the 2012 deadline on truck population, VMT,
fuel consumption and emission rates, taking advantage of the exogenous choices of
targeted model years from 1996 to 1999. Denote the outcome variable (truck popu-
lation, VMT, fuel consumption or NOx emissions) of model year i vehicles as yit in
9However, such difference in trends between pre- and post-MY 1996 vanishes once we specify
them as linear functions. See C.3 for details.
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calendar year t. The DD model can be written as follows:
yit = µi + τt + δDit + g(ai) + εit , (3.5)
in which µi is the model year fixed effects and τt represents the calendar year fixed
effects. The treatment Dit is defined as
Dit =

1 if i ∈ [1996, 1999] & t = 2012,
0 Otherwise.
(3.6)
Additionally, we include g(ai), a function of truck age in the model to cap-
ture the natural attrition in the truck population. In the empirical estimation, we
specify g(ai) as a third-order polynomial function. We apply the same estimation
method to examine the effect on all four outcome variables. The estimation results
are presented in Table 3.5. Dit denotes the interaction term of vehicles with the
targeted model years and calendar year 2012. The coefficients of Dit, δ
′s, indicate
the effects of the retrofit/replacement deadline on the targeted truck groups. The
estimation results in column (1) show that for each vehicle class, there are about
58% fewer MY 1996 to 1999 trucks operating in 2012 than similar trucks with other
model years. The effect on VMT, fuel consumption and NOx are above 70%.
DD estimation produces smaller estimates (in absolute value) than the esti-
mation results from RD design. In particular, RD design predicts 71% reduction in
truck population due to the retrofit/replacement deadline, while DD results show
that the reduction is only 58%. The RD design does not differentiate between vehicle
age and model year, attributing the population reduction entirely to the regulation.
96
Table 3.5: Estimation Results: Difference-in-difference Approach





(in log) (millions) (million
miles/day)
(gallons/mile) (1000 tons/day)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
δ -0.578∗∗∗ -0.711∗∗∗ -0.708∗∗∗ -0.760∗∗∗
(0.0448) (0.0461) (0.0463) (0.0457)
age 0.150∗∗∗ 0.123∗∗∗ 0.121∗∗∗ 0.129∗∗∗
(0.00421) (0.00473) (0.00472) (0.00468)
age2 -0.0125∗∗∗ -0.0135∗∗∗ -0.0134∗∗∗ -0.0139∗∗∗
(0.000248) (0.000259) (0.000260) (0.000257)
age3 0.000184∗∗∗ 0.000198∗∗∗ 0.000196∗∗∗ 0.000203∗∗∗
(0.00000427) (0.00000429) (0.00000431) (0.00000427)
N 260,484 260,484 260,484 260,484
R2 0.542 0.581 0.573 0.579
Note: ∗ : p < 0.1; ∗∗ : p < 0.05; ∗∗∗ : p < 0.01
Dct denotes the interaction term of calendar year 2012 and heavy-duty trucks that are subject to
the 2012 deadline.
County fixed effects, model year fixed effects and calendar year fixed effects are included in all
above regressions.
On the other hand, the DD estimation incorporates additional calendar years, al-
lowing us to consider both trends due to vehicle age and specific patterns that may
be present in certain model years. The DD estimate attributes some of the decrease
in the affected population from 2011 to 2012 to the natural trends10 as vehicles age.
The difference may also be explained by the spill-over effect to vehicles in
the control group – heavy-duty trucks with model years before 1996 or after 1999.
For example, as shown in Table 3.1, vehicles with engine model year from 2000 to
2004 are subject to the 2013 deadline. The enforcement of the 2012 deadline may
expedite the vehicle replacement/retirement of trucks with model year after 2000.
10The natural business-as-usual attrition of vehicles is illustrated in C.5. An ordinary least
squares (OLS) regression reveals the natural rate of replacement is about 9.5%.
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3.5 How many trucks were exempted from the regulation?
As introduced in section 3.2.2, trucks that are solely operated in NOx-exempt
counties enjoy a postponed deadline of compliance. EMFAC dataset provides ve-
hicles’ registration counties, in lieu of operation location. Registration in a NOx-
exempt county is not a necessary condition for the exemption as trucks may travel
outside their registration counties. This is also evident in columns (2) and (5) in
Tables 3.2 and 3.3, where trucks registered in NOx-exempt counties experience a
similar change with less magnitude in truck population and other outcome variables
as the other two groups. How many of them were truly exempted from the 2012
deadline? This estimate of proportion of trucks that are solely operated within their
registration counties is important for the cost and benefit analysis of the TBR pro-
gram; yet, there is lack of studies to provide such an estimate.
We restrict our sample to those registered in NOx-exempt counties and re-
peat the exercise in Section 3.4.2. We estimate the effects of the 2012 deadline on
trucks that are registered in these counties. By comparing the effects within and
outside of the NOx-exempt counties, we are able to quantify the proportion of trucks
registered in NOx-exempt counties that are actually exempted from the regulation
because they are solely operated in those counties. Such information is crucial to
ARB in terms of predicting the compliance rate and evaluating the net benefit of
the program.
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Table 3.6: The effects of the 2012 deadline in NOx-exempt counties





(in log) (millions) (million
miles/day)
(gallons/mile) (1000 tons/day)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
δ′it -0.455
∗∗∗ -0.600∗∗∗ -0.598∗∗∗ -0.650∗∗∗
(0.0865) (0.0872) (0.0874) (0.0869)
age 0.0995∗∗∗ 0.0685∗∗∗ 0.0701∗∗∗ 0.0758∗∗∗
(0.00718) (0.00766) (0.00764) (0.00761)
age2 -0.0109∗∗∗ -0.0118∗∗∗ -0.0118∗∗∗ -0.0122∗∗∗
(0.000426) (0.000432) (0.000432) (0.000430)
age3 0.000155∗∗∗ 0.000169∗∗∗ 0.000169∗∗∗ 0.000175∗∗∗
(0.00000740) (0.00000729) (0.00000730) (0.00000728)
N 134341 134341 134341 134341
Adj. R2 0.425 0.480 0.475 0.477
Note: ∗ : p < 0.1; ∗∗ : p < 0.05; ∗∗∗ : p < 0.01
δ′it denotes the coefficients of the interaction term of calendar year 2012 and heavy-duty trucks
that are subject to the 2012 deadline.
County fixed effects, model year fixed effects and calendar year fixed effects are included in all
above regressions.
Table 3.6 provides the estimation results using difference-in-difference ap-
proach with samples restricted to heavy-duty trucks registered in NOx-exempt coun-
ties. 45.5% of trucks with model years from 1996 to 1999 are replaced in 2012 in
these counties. VMT and fuel consumption are reduced by 60%. Column (4) shows
that NOx emissions drop by 65%.
Recall that Section 3.2.1 introduces the regulation and truckers’ options – they
can comply by either replacing their vehicles or installing PM filters to their exist-
ing vehicles. Suppose the percentage of targeted trucks complying by installing PM
filters is relatively stable across all counties, we can infer the proportion of trucks
registered in NOx-exempt counties that are solely operated within these counties.
Denote this proportion as x%. The assumption can be restated as the replacement
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rates among trucks that are subject to the 2012 deadline remain the same in reg-
ulated counties and NOx-exempt counties, which can be expressed in the following
equation:
(1− x%)δit = δ′it , (3.7)
in which δit is the effect on truck population in regulated counties and the estimates
is 57.8%. δ′it is the effect in NOx-exempt counties, 45.5% (column 1 in Table 3.6).
Substitute the numbers into equation 3.7, and we derive x = 21.3. That is to
say, there are about 21.3% of heavy-duty trucks registered in NOx-exempt counties
are solely operated in those counties; therefore, they are not subject to the 2012
deadline.
3.6 Conclusion
In this paper, we provide a methodology for ex-post evaluation of outcomes
from California’s State Truck and Bus Regulation. While ARB conducts regulatory
impact analyses for all new regulations, this process takes place in regulatory de-
velopment and assumptions are generally not revisited once regulations have been
passed. Using data that is informed by DMV data, this approach allows us to con-
sider the impact on vehicle replacement behavior.
We conduct the empirical analysis using two estimation methods on four
changes of outcomes – truck population, vehicle-miles traveled, fuel consumption
and NOx emission. First, using a regression discontinuity design, we focus on the
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truck group that is subject to the 2012 deadline and find a 71.4% reduction in truck
population once the regulation becomes binding. The other three outcome variables
experienced slightly more reductions. Second, the exogenous choice of targeted
model years allows us to conduct a difference-in-difference estimation. Trucks with
model years before or after 1996-1999 are not required to retrofit or replace by 2012;
therefore they form a control group. The difference-in-difference analysis provides
us a lower estimate of the effects – the number of trucks is reduced by 57.8% and
daily VMT aggregated at the truck model level decreases by almost 71.1%. Since
the truckers may choose to comply by installing PM filters or replacing the engine,
a 57.8% reduction in truck population implies that 42.2% of them chose to retrofit
and keep the vehicles. The empirical analyses present evidence of how the industry
responds to the engine model year schedule and provide input to revisit the regula-
tory impact analyses. Both RD and DD estimation results show that the reduction
in fuel consumption and NOx are more substantial than the percentage of truck pop-
ulation decrease. We suggest California ARB to take this positive spill-over effect
into account when calculating the local environmental benefit of the regulation.
According to the regulation, trucks that are solely operated in NOx-exempt
counties are not subject to the 2012 deadline. How many trucks registered in these
counties are solely driven locally? This is a valuable question because the estimate
of it is directly linked to the cost and benefit analysis of this regulation. We restrict
our sample to heavy-duty trucks that are registered in NOx-exempt counties and ap-
ply the same difference-in-difference estimation. We find a 45.5% reduction in truck
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population in 2012. Assuming the percentage of truckers who choose to retrofit
stays the same across all counties, we infer from a simple calculation (equation 3.7)
that 21.3% trucks solely operated within NOx-exempt counties.
Additionally, two sources of unintended costs should be raised to attention.
First, the replaced trucks will be either sold to other states or kept in NOx-exempt
counties. Both scenarios imply negative externalities and partially offset the benefit
of the regulatory program. If most of the old trucks leak to NOx-exempt counties,
the local air quality will take the toll. Second, the sudden change in fleet makeup
creates a short-term over demand for newer truck models. This may result in high
price premium for newer truck models, which adds more financial burden to small
business owners who have to upgrade their trucks.
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Appendix A: Appendix for Chapter 1
A.1 Variables omitted from the summary statistics table
• Other axle configurations include “2 axles - 1 axle trailer,” “2 axles - 3 or more
axle trailer,” “2 axles - 3 trailers,” “2 axles - two trailers,” “3 axles - 1 axle
trailer,” “3 axles - 3 or more axle trailer,” “3 axles - three trailers,” “3 axles -
two trailers,” “4 or more axles,” “4 or more axles - 1 axle trailer,” “4 or more
axles - 2 axle trailer,” “4 or more axles - 3 or more axle trailer,” “4 or more
axles - two trailers” and “4 or more axles - three trailers.”
• Other vehicle makes include autocar, other(domestic) and other(foreign).
• Other body/trailer types include automobile transport; beverage truck; con-
crete mixer; drop frame van; garbage truck; grain bodies; insulated non-
refrigerated van; livestock truck; low boy; multistop or step van; oil field
truck; open top van; platform with devices permanently mounted on it; pole,
logging, pulpwood or pipe truck; service truck or craftsman’s vehicle; tank
truck for dry bulk; tank truck for liquids or gases; utility truck; winch or crane
truck; wrecker; yard tractor; and other.
• Other cab types include cab forward of engine, beside engine or other.
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• Other primary cargo include chemicals or drugs; farm products; household
goods; live animals; lumber or fabricated wood products; metal products;
mining products; miscellaneous products of manufacturing; no load carried;
paper, textiles or apparel; petroleum products; plastics or rubber products;
processed foods; tools, machinery or equipment; waste or scrap; and other.
• Engine displacement (in cubic inch) are grouped into bins as follows – 1 to
300; 301 to 399; 400 to 499; 500 to 599; 600 to 699; 700 to 799; 800 to 899;
900 or more.
• Number of cylinders are categorized as 4, 6, 8 and more than 8.
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A.2 First stage estimation
The instrumental variable used in the main regressions is the per-mile fuel
cost in states that do not share a border with home base states. In section 1.5.2,
I apply an alternative instrumental variable as a robustness check. The alternative
IV is constructed by dividing crude oil price by MPG. The results of the first stage
estimation in the 2SLS approach are presented in Table A.1.
Table A.1: First Stage Estimation Results
IV Average fuel prices in non-neighboring states Global crude oil prices
Combination Vocational Combination Vocational
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Coefficients of IV -5.999∗∗∗ -8.590∗∗∗ 0.0169∗∗∗ 0.0136∗∗∗
(0.0406) (0.0632) (0.00197) (0.000054)
R2 0.935 0.931 0.916 0.899
p-value of F statistics < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001
Note: ∗∗∗ : p < 0.01; robust standard errors are shown in parenthesis.
Dependent variable is ln(fuel cost per mile).
Columns (1) and (2) are first stage estimations corresponding to the IV estimation shown in Table
1.2 and Table 1.3.
Columns (1) and (2) are first stage estimations corresponding to the robustness check using alter-
native IV shown in Table A.6.
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A.3 Regional Division by EIA
Figure A.1: Map of regional division in the U.S.
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A.4 Heterogeneity of Responsiveness by Other Categories
A.4.1 By operator class
There are generally three operator classes, for-hire, private and rental. For-hire
trucks are provided by companies or individuals who own the trucks. An individual
who not only owns the truck, but also drives it for compensation, is referred as an
“owner operator.” A for-hire truck is required for a commercial vehicle DOT (De-
partment of Transportation) number. As shown in Figure A.2, about half of the
combination trucks in my sample are for-hire trucks, while 85% of the vocational
vehicles are operated privately. Private trucks are used for business solely for the
companies that own the trucks. In some cases, private trucks may remain privately
licensed if they are not exclusively for business use. The third operator class is
rental. Rental trucks only comprise a small percentage of my sample, about 2% for
both groups. Typically, these are moving trucks for daily rental. Driving service is
usually not provided by truck rental companies.
As shown in Table A.2, for combination trucks, for-hire trucks are the most
responsive to fuel costs among the three operator classes. In particular, a 10%
increase in fuel cost per mile reduces VMT of for-hire trucks by 2.57%, and private
trucks by 2.20%. Since for-hire truck owners have the flexibility to choose cargo,
schedules and routes, it is not surprising that they are the most responsive to changes
in fuel costs. As for vocational vehicles, for-hire vehicles appear to be less sensitive
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Table A.2: Estimation Results by Operator Class
Dependent variable: ln(VMT) ln(PD)
CombinationVocational CombinationVocational
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Elasticities by operator class:
For-hire -0.257∗∗∗ -0.207∗∗∗ -0.493∗∗∗ -0.412∗∗∗
(0.0393) (0.0230) (0.0330) (0.0419)
Private -0.220∗∗∗ -0.285∗∗∗ -0.386∗∗∗ -0.344∗∗∗
(0.0346) (0.0148) (0.0307) (0.0167)
Rental -0.194∗∗ -0.287∗∗∗ -0.250∗ -0.601∗∗∗
(0.0827) (0.0480) (0.148) (0.0573)
Control variables
ln(average vehicle weight) 0.408∗∗∗ 0.239∗∗∗ 2.529∗∗∗ 1.933∗∗∗
(0.0223) (0.0191) (0.0282) (0.0398)
ln(odometer reading) 0.484∗∗∗ 0.484∗∗∗ 0.481∗∗∗ 0.510∗∗∗
(0.00706) (0.0174) (0.00522) (0.0184)
ln(state GDP) 0.0780∗ -0.00331 0.0669∗∗ 0.0356
(0.0406) (0.0617) (0.0331) (0.0723)
Survey year FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Home base state FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other truck characteristics? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Business and operational characteristics? Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of observation 109039 75762 109039 75762
Adjusted R2 0.551 0.427 0.681 0.562
Note: ∗ : p < 0.1; ∗∗ : p < 0.05; ∗∗∗ : p < 0.01
All standard errors are clustered at the level of home base regions and shown in parentheses.
In each regression, operator class dummy variables are interacted with ln(fuel cost per mile). The
elasticity for a particular operator class is the sum of coefficients of the interaction term and
ln(fuel cost per mile); the robust standard error is calculated based on the linear combination
correspondingly.
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Figure A.2: Distribution of Trucks by Operator Class
to fuel costs than private vehicles. Columns (3) and (4) provide the estimated
elasticities of payload distance by operator class. The elasticities are greater in
magnitude, showing that payload is also negatively affected by increase in fuel costs.
Such effect is even more obvious for for-hire vocational vehicles, as the elasticity of
payload distance is almost double the elasticity of VMT.
A.4.2 By Fleet Size
Are truck owners or fleet managers assigning trips strategically to trucks based
on their fuel costs? If so, trucks in a large fleet have more flexibility in substitution.
I should expect them to be more responsive to changes in fuel costs than those in
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Table A.3: Number of Trucks by Fleet Size
Combination Trucks Vocational Vehicles
1 22,372 11,288
2 to 5 17,719 23,509
6 to 20 22,236 23,415
21 or more 51,137 25,758
Total 113,464 83,970
Data source: U.S. Vehicle Inventory and Use Survey (1982-2002).
a small fleet. In VIUS, the size of fleet is categorized into four bins.1 The number
of truck counts in each bin is presented in Table A.3. While combination trucks are
spread relatively evenly in fleets of different sizes, about 70% of vocational vehicles
are in relatively small fleets that have fewer than 20 trucks.
I interact fleet size dummy variables with the natural log of per-mile fuel cost,
and add the interaction terms to the estimation equation specified in equations (1.4)
and (1.6) to estimate the elasticities of VMT and payload distance with respect to
fuel costs. The estimates of interest are listed in Table A.4. In general, both VMT
and payload distance are more elastic to fuel cost per mile as fleet size increases.
This general trend, with a few exceptions, appears to confirm my expectations. For
combination trucks, the elasticity of VMT in a fleet with 21 or more trucks is more
than the elasticity in a single-truck fleet by about 75%. Vocational vehicles in a
large fleet with more than 21 trucks reduce VMT by about 2.89% when per-mile
fuel cost increases by 10%, while a one-vehicle fleet responds only by 2.06%. The
estimation results of payload distance tell a similar story. As shown columns (3)
1The categorization for fleet size is similar, yet not exactly the same, across the survey years.
Some adjustments are made to make the grouping consistent.
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Table A.4: Estimation Results by Fleet Size
Dependent variable: ln(VMT) ln(PD)
CombinationVocational CombinationVocational
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Elasticities by fleet size:
1 -0.104∗∗ -0.203∗∗∗ -0.279∗∗∗ -0.218∗∗∗
(0.0437) (0.0189) (0.0528) (0.0297)
2 to 5 -0.157∗∗∗ -0.329∗∗∗ -0.302∗∗∗ -0.401∗∗∗
(0.0281) (0.0149) (0.0282) 0.0178
6 to 20 -0.277∗∗∗ -0.255∗∗∗ -0.388∗∗∗ -0.358∗∗∗
(0.0316) (0.0117) (0.0332) 0.0249
21 or more -0.313∗∗∗ -0.271∗∗∗ -0.577∗∗∗ -0.425∗∗∗
(0.0533) (0.0238) (0.052) 0.0338
Control variables
ln(average vehicle weight) 0.405∗∗∗ 0.216∗∗∗ 2.542∗∗∗ 1.938∗∗∗
(0.0224) (0.0155) (0.0274) (0.0384)
ln(odometer reading) 0.487∗∗∗ 0.489∗∗∗ 0.484∗∗∗ 0.512∗∗∗
(0.00753) (0.0168) (0.00549) (0.0183)
ln(state GDP) 0.0814∗ 0.0130 0.0662∗∗ 0.0434
(0.0434) (0.0618) (0.0326) (0.0755)
Survey year FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Home base state FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other truck characteristics? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Business and operational characteristics? Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of observation 109,039 75,762 109,039 75,762
Adjusted R2 0.548 0.425 0.679 0.560
Note: ∗ : p < 0.1; ∗∗ : p < 0.05; ∗∗∗ : p < 0.01
All standard errors are clustered at the level of home base regions and shown in parentheses.
In each regression, fleet size dummy variables are interacted with ln(fuel cost per mile). The
elasticity for a particular operator class is the sum of coefficients of the interaction term and
ln(fuel cost per mile); the robust standard error is calculated based on the linear combination
correspondingly.
All estimations use the 2SLS estimation approach to control for the plausible endogeneity of fuel costs.
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and (4), elasticities (in absolute values) are the highest in a fleet with more than 21
trucks. All estimates are highly statistically significant.
112
A.5 Robustness Checks and the Falsification Test: Details
Table A.5: Robustness check 1: estimate with aggregate data
Dependent variable: ln(VMT) ln(PD)
Combination Vocational Combination Vocational
Overall elasticities -0.211∗∗∗ -0.262∗∗∗ -0.393∗∗∗ -0.350∗∗∗
(0.0316) (0.0254) (0.0322) (0.0312)
Elasticities by GVWR:
GVWR = 3 -0.271∗∗∗ -0.543∗∗∗
(0.0860) (0.145)
GVWR = 4 -0.361∗∗ -0.312
(0.182) (0.266)
GVWR = 5 -0.452∗∗∗ -0.571∗∗∗
(0.166) (0.207)
GVWR = 6 -0.281∗∗∗ -0.287∗∗∗
(0.0388) (0.0543)
GVWR = 7 -0.380∗∗∗ -0.270∗∗∗ -0.433∗∗∗ -0.341∗∗∗
(0.0595) (0.0405) (0.0719) (0.0482)
GVWR = 8 -0.184∗∗∗ -0.199∗∗∗ -0.385∗∗∗ -0.285∗∗∗
(0.0332) (0.0291) (0.0332) (0.0329)
Elasticities by business sector:
Agriculture or forestry 0.129∗ -0.304∗∗∗ -0.0852 -0.272∗∗∗
(0.0726) (0.0493) (0.0728) (0.0517)
Business and personal service -0.371∗∗ -0.270∗∗∗ -0.596∗∗∗ -0.352∗∗∗
(0.148) (0.0362) (0.166) (0.0503)
Construction -0.258∗∗∗ -0.232∗∗∗ -0.368∗∗∗ -0.336∗∗∗
(0.0677) (0.0359) (0.0867) (0.0433)
For-hire transportation -0.256∗∗∗ -0.248∗∗∗ -0.537∗∗∗ -0.440∗∗∗
(0.0350) (0.0397) (0.0456) (0.0476)
Manufacturing -0.402∗∗∗ -0.266∗∗∗ -0.521∗∗∗ -0.325∗∗∗
(0.0594) (0.0566) (0.0743) (0.0759)
Mining or quarrying -0.231∗∗ -0.081 -0.329∗∗∗ -0.0297
(0.112) (0.0847) (0.124) (0.140)
Rental or contractor -0.325∗∗∗ -0.312∗∗∗ -0.392∗∗∗ -0.376∗∗∗
(0.0968) (0.0476) (0.142) (0.0605)
Retail and wholesale trade -0.249∗∗∗ -0.271∗∗∗ -0.432∗∗∗ -0.381∗∗∗
(0.0534) (0.0302) (0.0501) (0.0446)
Other -0.198∗∗∗ -0.291∗∗∗ -0.135 -0.532∗∗∗
(0.205) (0.0415) (0.167) (0.0693)
Note: ∗ : p < 0.1; ∗∗ : p < 0.05; ∗∗∗ : p < 0.01
All standard errors, shown in parentheses, are clustered at the level of home base states and survey
years.
2SLS estimation method is used in all regressions.
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Table A.6: Robustness Check 2: Estimate with Alternative IV
Dependent variable: ln(VMT) ln(PD)
Combination Vocational Combination Vocational
Overall elasticities -0.225∗∗∗ -0.269∗∗∗ -0.419∗∗∗ -0.359∗∗∗
(0.0313) (0.0210) (0.0317) (0.0256)
Elasticities by GVWR:
GVWR = 3 -0.172∗∗ -0.366∗∗∗
(0.0864) (0.139)
GVWR = 4 -0.385∗∗ -0.146
(0.187) (0.278)
GVWR = 5 -0.462∗∗∗ -0.689∗∗∗
(0.178) (0.227)
GVWR = 6 -0.263∗∗∗ -0.281∗∗∗
(0.0372) (0.0553)
GVWR = 7 -0.395∗∗∗ -0.181∗∗∗ -0.563∗∗∗ -0.254∗∗∗
(0.0542) (0.0332) (0.0625) (0.0475)
GVWR = 8 -0.200∗∗∗ -0.239∗∗∗ -0.395∗∗∗ -0.322∗∗∗
(0.0336) (0.0236) (0.0337) (0.0265)
Elasticities by business sector:
Agriculture or forestry 0.221∗∗∗ -0.239∗∗∗ 0.0192 -0.230∗∗∗
(0.0753) (0.0468) (0.0688) (0.0524)
Business and personal service -0.501∗∗∗ -0.342∗∗∗ -0.609∗∗∗ -0.404∗∗∗
(0.126) (0.0309) (0.163) (0.0506)
Construction -0.372∗∗∗ -0.303∗∗∗ -0.524∗∗∗ -0.399∗∗∗
(0.072) (0.0317) (0.0913) (0.0360)
For-hire transportation -0.332∗∗∗ -0.273∗∗∗ -0.551∗∗∗ -0.524∗∗∗
(0.0374) (0.0341) (0.0443) (0.0456)
Manufacturing -0.233∗∗∗ -0.236∗∗∗ -0.402∗∗∗ -0.317∗∗∗
(0.0485) (0.0524) (0.0630) (0.0685)
Mining or quarrying -0.405∗∗∗ -0.127 -0.513∗∗∗ -0.152
(0.131) (0.0829) (0.135) (0.110)
Rental or contractor -0.248∗∗∗ -0.342∗∗∗ -0.410∗∗∗ -0.476∗∗∗
(0.0775) (0.0469) (0.113) (0.0639)
Retail and wholesale trade -0.235∗∗∗ -0.207∗∗∗ -0.493∗∗∗ -0.274∗∗∗
(0.0521) (0.0270) (0.0546) (0.0391)
Other -0.188 -0.257∗∗∗ -0.148 -0.473∗∗∗
(0.155) (0.0372) (0.176) (0.0573)
Note: ∗ : p < 0.1; ∗∗ : p < 0.05; ∗∗∗ : p < 0.01
All standard errors, shown in parentheses, are clustered at the level of home base states and survey
years.
2SLS estimation method is used in all regressions.
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Table A.7: Falsification Test: Randomize Fuel Cost per Mile
Dependent variable: ln(VMT) ln(PD)
Combination Vocational Combination Vocational
Overall elasticities -0.0124 -0.0176 -0.0157 -0.00546
(0.00969) (0.0151) (0.0119) (0.0160)
Elasticities by GVWR:
GVWR = 3 -0.0871∗ -0.211∗∗
(0.0480) (0.0892)
GVWR = 4 -0.0846 -0.0478
(0.0851) (0.137)
GVWR = 5 0.0588 -0.0274
(0.109) (0.163)
GVWR = 6 -0.00639 0.0241
(0.0303) (0.0416)
GVWR = 7 -0.0216 -0.0255 -0.00869 0.0212
(0.0377) (0.0369) (0.0409) (0.0508)
GVWR = 8 -0.0116 -0.0142 -0.0162 -0.00702
(0.0107) (0.0190) (0.0129) (0.0206)
Elasticities by business sector:
Agriculture or forestry -0.0222 -0.0355 -0.0266 -0.00551
(0.0335) (0.0435) (0.0373) (0.0473)
Business and personal service 0.0573 0.0533 0.0697 -0.0185
(0.0653) (0.0458) (0.0835) (0.0514)
Construction 0.0102 -0.0249 -0.0168 -0.0159
(0.0399) (0.0301) (0.0486) (0.0338)
For-hire transportation -0.00293 -0.0554 -0.00819 -0.00792
(0.00987) (0.0369) (0.0133) (0.0434)
Manufacturing -0.0256 -0.0761 -0.0215 -0.0195
(0.0450) (0.0614) (0.0493) (0.0764)
Mining or quarrying -0.0392 -0.0326 0.0593 0.0337
(0.0652) (0.0699) (0.0827) (0.0980)
Rental or contractor -0.0888 -0.00817 -0.0882 -0.0108
(0.0627) (0.0479) (0.0679) (0.0777)
Retail and wholesale trade -0.0352 -0.0255 -0.0451 -0.0185
(0.0238) (0.0290) (0.0276) (0.0298)
Other -0.0338 0.0852∗∗ 0.0185 0.136∗
(0.150) (0.0411) (0.141) (0.0814)
Note: ∗ : p < 0.1; ∗∗ : p < 0.05; ∗∗∗ : p < 0.01
All standard errors, shown in parentheses, are clustered at the level of home base states and survey
years.
2SLS estimation method is used in all regressions.
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A.6 Derive the Expression of Marginal Welfare Effect and Optimal
Taxes
A.6.1 Derive Marginal Welfare Effects
A household chooses Ri, Y , A, subject to time and budget constraints (equa-
tion 1.9 and 1.10, to maximize the utility (equation 1.7). The indirect utility function
can be written as follows.
ũ = u(Ri, Y, A, πA, Z) + λ
[
I + LST −
∑
i
piRi − Y − (tG + PG)fGA
]
(A.1)




uA = πuΠ = λ(tG + PG)fG (A.3)
uY − λ = 0 (A.4)






































































Substituting (A.6), (A.7), (A.8) and (A.9) into (A.5) and rearranging terms
give the expression of marginal welfare effects shown in (1.18)-(1.21).
A.6.2 Derive Optimal Taxes

















tuting in the definition of elasticities, congestion offset, and passenger car equivalent
give equation (1.22)
A.6.3 Derive εfi and ε
F
i
The elasticity of VMT with respect to per-mile fuel cost ηTi can be decomposed
using the chain rule and the definition of per-mile fuel cost.
ηTi =
dVMT
d[(PD + ti) · fi]












Rearranging terms gives equation (1.25).
Similarly, the elasticity of fuel use with respect to diesel price can be decomposed
















Appendix B: Appendix for Chapter 2
B.1 Engine displacement and horsepower
Engine displacement (CID) is the volume swept by all the pistons inside the
cylinders of a reciprocating engine in a single movement from top dead center to
bottom dead center. It is determined by the area of the bore, the length of the
stroke and the number of cylinders. The formula is as follows.
Displacement = π
4
× bore2 × stroke× number of cylinders
Generally speaking, engine displacement indicates the volume of the cylin-
ders, which loosely defines the size of explosion inside the cylinders; therefore it
suggests the engine’s power. While other factors, for example, turbochargers and
superchargers, can also affect the size of explosion, engine displacement is an impor-
tant indicator of engine’s power and closely related to the performance of the engine.
Horsepower (HP) is a measurement of power. 1 HP is the equivalent of 33,000
ft/lbfs per minute. It represents the torque at the wheels, i.e., the power to rotate
wheels and accelerate the vehicle. Horsepower is a man-made number. It is defined
as the product of torque at the engine and revolutions per minute (RPM) divided by
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5252. Torque at the engine is the rotational force generated by the engine. Torque
at the wheels is the combination of torque at the engine with the torque magnifi-
cation given by the transmission through gearing. (Note that torque at the engine
and torque at the wheels are different concepts.)
In a nutshell, while both horsepower and engine displacement indicate the en-
gine’s power, they are different measurements. Engine displacement focuses on the
physical size of the engine; horsepower is a performance indicator. They are closely
related, as horsepower is largely determined by the torque (at the engine), which is
generated by the engine; and the engine’s power is largely determined by the size of
explosion inside the cylinders’engine displacement.
From 1977 to 2002, there are 6 years of data from Vehicle Inventory and Use
Survey (VIUS) that are publicly available. Information regarding engine displace-
ment is documented in all years of survey; however, data of horsepower are available
only in survey year 1977, 1982 and 1987. The questions asked in the survey about
these two variables are as follows.
• Engine displacement: What is the displacement of the engine in cubic inches?
• Horsepower: What is the horsepower rating of your engine?
The format of the data is either numerical or categorical. In particular,
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Survey year 1977 1982 1987
Engine displacement Numerical Categorical Categorical
Horsepower Numerical Numerical Categorical
In survey year 1977, the correlation between engine displacement and horse-
power is about 0.67. If we aggregate the data by model year and vehicle make, the
correlation goes up to 0.81.
In survey year 1982, engine displacement divides the range of 0 to 1500 into
21 bins. I replace the CID with the mid point of each bin and derive its correlation
with the numerical horsepower reported in the data. The correlation is about 0.86.
If we aggregate the data by model year and vehicle make, the correlation is 0.98.
In survey year 1987, both CID and horsepower are documented categorically.
The categories of CID are the same as in 1982, while the data of horsepower are
shown in 7 bins, with the rating ranging from 0 to 475. Again, I replace these two
variables with the mid point of each bin and calculate the correlation at about 0.59.
The correlation with aggregated data is about 0.91.
In each survey year, I plot the LOWESS smoothing graph for CID and horse-
power against vehicle model year for class 7,8 combination trucks. As the graphs
show, CID and horsepower move closely together, indicating a strong positive cor-
relation between these two variables.
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Figure B.1: Relationship between CID and horsepower - data from survey year 1977
Figure B.2: Relationship between CID and horsepower - data from survey year 1982
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Figure B.3: Relationship between CID and horsepower - data from survey year 1987
To conclude, although it would make our study more comprehensive had we
known the horsepower and torque in all survey years, we believe engine displacement
serves as a good approximate to engine power given the strong correlation between
CID and horsepower as explained above.
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Appendix C: Appendix for Chapter 3
C.1 Engine Model Year Schedule for Light-duty Vehicles
Table C.1: Engine Model Year Schedule for Lighter Trucks
Engine Model Year Replacement Date
1995 and older January 1, 2015
1996 January 1, 2016
1997 January 1, 2017
1998 January 1, 2018
1999 January 1, 2019
2003 and older January 1, 2020
2004-2006 January 1, 2021
2007-2009 January 1, 2023
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C.2 Enforcement
In California, the emission regulation to trucking firms are enforced through
two programs – Heavy-Duty Vehicle Inspection Program (HDVIP or roadside pro-
gram) and Periodic Smoke Inspection Program (PSIP or fleet program). The road-
side program was first became operative in November 1991. Heavy-duty vehicles
are tested by CARB inspectors at various roadside locations to identify vehicles
that emit excessive smoke or have defective or tampered emission control system.
This program was interrupted from October 1993 to February 1996 due to technical
reasons. The Periodic Smoke Inspection Program (the fleet program) was became
operative in January 1996 with a 15-month phase-in schedule.1 Starting July 1,
1998, all trucks are required to take this annual inspection.2
1First 25% of an operator’s fleet have to be tested by July 1, 1996.
2This inspection is currently conducted by California Highway Patrol.
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C.3 RD Design Results With Linear Specification
Table C.2: Estimation Results: Regression Discontinuity Design With Linear Spec-
ification





(in log) (millions) (million
miles/day)
(gallons/mile) (1000 tons/day)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
β1 0.267
∗∗∗ 0.287∗∗∗ 0.261∗∗∗ 0.236∗∗∗
(0.0342) (0.0343) (0.0343) (0.0343)
ρ -0.506∗∗∗ -0.543∗∗∗ -0.514∗∗∗ -0.522∗∗∗
(0.0822) (0.0824) (0.0824) (0.0825)
γ1 -0.0749
∗ -0.0496 -0.0126 0.0540
(0.0401) (0.0402) (0.0402) (0.0402)
N 5697 5697 5697 5697
Adj. R2 0.804 0.807 0.807 0.804
Note: ∗ : p < 0.1; ∗∗ : p < 0.05; ∗∗∗ : p < 0.01
Vehicle class fixed effects and county fixed effects are included in all regressions.
C.4 Additional graphical evidence
C.5 Business-as-usual Replacement of Vehicles Over Time
Naturally, vehicles are replaced over time. In figure C.4, we provide evidence of
heavy-duty trucks with model year from 1996 to 1999 being replaced from calendar
year 2004 to 2011. The business-as-usual attrition rate, illustrated as the slope, can
be estimated using an OLS approach.
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Figure C.1: Percentage change in VMT from 2011 to 2012
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Figure C.2: Percentage change in fuel consumption from 2011 to 2012
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Figure C.3: Percentage change in CO2 emission from 2011 to 2012
129
Figure C.4: Business-as-usual Replacement
130
Bibliography
Adenbaum, J., Copeland, A., and Stevens, J. (2015). Do truckers undervalue fuel
efficiency? Working paper.
Anderson, M. L. and Auffhammer, M. (2014). Pounds that kill: The external costs
of vehicle weight. The Review of Economic Studies, 81(2):535–571.
Barla, P., Gilbert-Gonthier, M., and Kuelah, J.-R. T. (2014). The demand for road
diesel in canada. Energy Economics, 43:316–322.
Bennett, S. (2012). Medium/heavy Duty Truck Engines, Fuel & Computerized Man-
agement Systems. Cengage Learning.
Bento, A. M., Goulder, L. H., Jacobsen, M. R., and Von Haefen, R. H. (2009). Dis-
tributional and efficiency impacts of increased US gasoline taxes. The American
Economic Review, 99(3):667–699.
Bovenberg, A. L. and Goulder, L. H. (1996). Optimal environmental taxation in the
presence of other taxes: general-equilibrium analyses. The American Economic
Review, pages 985–1000.
Boyd, J. H. and Mellman, R. E. (1980). The effect of fuel economy standards on
the us automotive market: an hedonic demand analysis. Transportation Research
Part A: General, 14(5-6):367–378.
Calthrop, E., De Borger, B., and Proost, S. (2007). Externalities and partial tax
reform: Does it make sense to tax road freight (but not passenger) transport?
Journal of Regional Science, 47(4):721–752.
Card, D., Katz, L. F., and Krueger, A. B. (1994). Comment on david neumark
and william wascher,” employment effects of minimum and subminimum wages:
Panel data on state minimum wage laws”. Industrial and Labor Relations Review,
pages 487–497.
Cook, T. D. (2008). “waiting for life to arrive”: a history of the regression-
discontinuity design in psychology, statistics and economics. Journal of Econo-
metrics, 142(2):636–654.
Cutter, W. B. and Neidell, M. (2009). Voluntary information programs and envi-
ronmental regulation: Evidence from ‘spare the air’. Journal of Environmental
Economics and Management, 58(3):253–265.
131
Dahl, C. A. (2012). Measuring global gasoline and diesel price and income elastici-
ties. Energy Policy, 41:2–13.
Decker, C. S. and Wohar, M. E. (2007). Determinants of state diesel fuel excise tax
rates: the political economy of fuel taxation in the united states. The Annals of
Regional Science, 41(1):171–188.
EPA (2015). EPA and NHTSA propose greenhouse gas and fuel efficiency standards
for medium- and heavy-duty trucks: By the numbers. EPA Reports.
FHWA (2000). Addendum to the 1997 federal highway cost allocation study final
reports. US Department of Transportation, Washington, DC.
Gillingham, K. (2012). Selection on anticipated driving and the consumer response
to changing gasoline prices. Unpublished working paper.
Gillingham, K. (2014). Identifying the elasticity of driving: evidence from a gasoline
price shock in california. Regional Science and Urban Economics, 47:13–24.
Goldberg, P. K. (1998). The effects of the corporate average fuel efficiency standards
in the US. The Journal of Industrial Economics, 46(1):1–33.
Goulder, L. H. and Williams, R. C. (2003). The substantial bias from ignoring
general equilibrium effects in estimating excess burden, and a practical solution.
Journal of political Economy, 111(4):898–927.
Greene, D. L. (1984). A derived demand model of regional highway diesel fuel use.
Transportation Research Part B: Methodological, 18(1):43–61.
Ivaldi, M. and Verboven, F. (2005). Quantifying the effects from horizontal mergers
in european competition policy. International Journal of Industrial Organization,
23(9):669–691.
Jacobsen, M. R. and Van Benthem, A. A. (2015). Vehicle scrappage and gasoline
policy. The American Economic Review, 105(3):1312–1338.
Knittel, C. R. (2011). Automobiles on steroids: Product attribute trade-offs and
technological progress in the automobile sector. The American Economic Review,
pages 3368–3399.
Leard, B., Linn, J., McConnell, V., and Raich, W. (2015). Fuel costs, economic
activity, and the rebound effect for heavy-duty trucks. Resources for the Future
Discussion Paper.
Newell, R. G., Jaffe, A. B., and Stavins, R. N. (1999). The induced innovation
hypothesis and energy-saving technological change. The Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 114(3):941–975.
Parry, I. W. (2008). How should heavy-duty trucks be taxed? Journal of Urban
Economics, 63(2):651–668.
132
Parry, I. W. and Small, K. A. (2005). Does britain or the united states have the
right gasoline tax? The American Economic Review, 95(4):1276–1289.
Ramli, A. R. and Graham, D. J. (2014). The demand for road transport diesel fuel
in the UK: Empirical evidence from static and dynamic cointegration techniques.
Transportation Research Part D: Transport and Environment, 26:60–66.
Ryan, S. P. (2012). The costs of environmental regulation in a concentrated industry.
Econometrica, 80(3):1019–1061.
Small, K. A. and Van Dender, K. (2007). Fuel efficiency and motor vehicle travel:
the declining rebound effect. The Energy Journal, pages 25–51.
to Assess Fuel Economy Technologies for Medium-and Heavy-Duty Vehicles, N. R.
C. U. C. (2010). Technologies and Approaches to Reducing the Fuel Consumption
of Medium-and Heavy-Duty Vehicles. National Academies Press.
West, J., Hoekstra, M., Meer, J., and Puller, S. L. (2017). Vehicle miles (not) trav-
eled: Fuel economy requirements, vehicle characteristics, and household driving.
Journal of Public Economics, 145:65–81.
West, S. E. (2004). Distributional effects of alternative vehicle pollution control
policies. Journal of public Economics, 88(3):735–757.
Williams, R. C. (2016). Environmental taxation. Resources for the Future Discussion
Paper.
Wollmann, T. (2014). Trucks without bailouts: Equilibrium product characteristics
for commercial vehicles. Chicago-Booth working paper.
133
